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Abstract: This paper (i) traces the historical origins of foreign aid, (ii) investigates trends in the 
volume, composition, allocation and quality of aid flows, and (iii) reviews the empirical literature 
on aid allocation. The paper concludes that, historically, aid has served a multitude of objectives. 
For some donors, the allocation and quality of aid have been largely shaped by concern for the 
development needs of recipients. By contrast, the foreign aid of some larger donors has been 
used principally as a foreign and commercial policy tool. Yet while this particular character of
aid flows may well have impaired the effectiveness of aid, there is no automatic contradiction
between donor and recipient objectives. Perhaps the most important change in the aid picture is 
the reversal after 1992 of the historic upward trend in aid volumes. This may not be a problem 
when smaller aid flows are compensated by private flows, as has happened in several developing 
countries. Yet it may be a problem in low-income countries without access to private capital, 
which continue to rely on aid for financial resources. The underlying premises of donor-
recipient cooperation are very different when aid resources become more limited, especially 
when debt service is still a factor of significance. The need to keep objectives and rationales 
clear turn out to be even more important. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Aid is an international operation channelling tens of billions of dollars to developing countries 
each year and employing hundreds of thousands of people in a multitude of organisations.1 
This paper first describes how aid has grown through various stages, from modest origins in 
the nineteenth century to being securely established following the Second World War, fuelled 
by the inertia of institutions created in the aftermath of the war (including the success of the 
Marshall Plan), the cold war and the wave of independence in the 1940s and fifties. Since then, 
further changes have taken place in institutions (the rise of multilaterals in the 1970s and NGOs 
in the eighties), types of aid (the decline of food aid and the rise and fall of financial 
programme aid) and aspects of donor ideology (mainly the perceived role of the state). We 
then go on to describe in more detail the main features of aid and how they have changed over 
time, considering volume, composition, allocation, financial terms and tying (section 3). 
Section 4 gives a more extended analysis of the allocation of aid, considering three questions: 
(i) how well is aid allocated, (ii) why is aid allocated as it is, and (iii) how should it be allocated? 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. History of foreign aid 
 
                                              
1 No figures exist for how many people are directly employed in the aid business: one of the largest 
institutions, the World Bank, alone employs thousands of people and over 40,000 aid-financed 
expatriates are estimated to be working in Africa. 
In this section we argue that, despite many changes over the years, there has been one constant 
in the history of aid, namely that the development objectives of aid programmes have been 
distorted by the use of aid for donor commercial and political advantage. This is not to say that 
aid has never been used for development nor achieved any beneficial effects, but this 
statement is conditioned by the firmly modernist ideological stance of donors: they tend to 
believe there is a single model of development based on a particular conception of Western 
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liberal democracy. We seek to illustrate these points in the following chronological discussion 
of the history of aid, following which we draw out some main issues. A summary chronology is 
presented in Table 1 and a schematic presentation in Table 2. 
 
THE ORIGINS OF FOREIGN AID 
 
The roots of aid can be traced to at least the nineteenth century.2 Two events in the history of 
US overseas aid (shown in the chronology in Table 1) at different ends of that century 
exemplify the tension in aid programmes between relief and assistance (illustrated by the 1812 
Act for the Relief of the Citizens of Venezuela) and attempts to serve donor commercial or 
political objectives (illustrated, beginning in 1896, by the conscious use of US food surpluses 
for market development). The same conflict is evident in the early years of UK assistance: the 
1929 Colonial Development Act allowed for loans and grants for infrastructure, the purpose of 
which was explicitly seen as obtaining inputs for British manufacturing. The 1940 Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act expanded the programme to allow funding of social sector 
activities, but the Minister of Food in the post-war Labour government stated that by one 
means or another, by hook or by crook, the development of 
                                              
2 Since our argument in this chapter is that aid programmes have always been hindered by their use 
for the political or commercial advantage of the donor, one could plausibly trace aid back to gifts 
from one king or ruler to another in medieval or even classical times. But there is a difference in that 
aid as mentioned here was also seen as a general benefit to the population of the recipient country 
and that some continuity can be established with the present-day aid infrastructure. 
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Table 1: Chronology of foreign aid. 
1812 US Congress passes Act for the Relief of the Citizens of Venezuela. 
1870s First discussions in UK of official finance for colonies under Chamberlain. 
1896 Transfer of food surplus (under Ministry of Agriculture) begins from US with 
intention of developing new markets. 
1918- Following WWI US ships 6.23 million tonnes of food aid to Europe, leading to 1933 
Act. 
1929 First UK Colonial Development Act. 
1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (price support scheme operated through Commodity 
Credit Corporation) marked beginning of systematic shipments outside of emergency 
situations. 
1942 Formation of United Nations (formally came into being in 1945). 
1943 Formation of UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). 
1944 Bretton Woods conference. Formation of Oxfam and CARE. 
1946 Formation of Unicef. 
1947 Launching of Marshall Plan (approximately 25 per cent of assistance under Marshall 
Plan was food, feed and fertilizer and so, as Marshall aid came to a close, US farmers 
lobbied for continuation of food aid, resulting in 1954 Act creating PL480). 
1949 UN establishes Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA). 
1950 Colombo Plan launched. In US: Act of International Development and Trumans 
Point Four speech. 
1950s Growth of Community Development Movement (CDM). 
1951 US Mutual Security Act. un recommends creation of SUNFED. 
 ...continues 
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Table 1 (continued): Chronology of foreign aid. 
1954 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (PL480). Section 2 states: It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to expand international trade among 
the United States and friendly nations, to facilitate the convertibility of currency, to 
promote the economic stability of American Agriculture and the national welfare, to 
make maximum efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of 
the foreign policy of the United States, and to stimulate the expansion of foreign 
trade in agricultural commodities produced in the United States... (In its first decade 
PL480 financed about 30 per cent of US agricultural exports). 
1955 First meeting of non-aligned movement. 
1956 Khrushchev announces expanded Soviet aid programme. Soviets take over funding 
of Aswan Dam in Egypt. 
1958 Formation of India Aid Consortia by World Bank and five main donors. 
1959 UN Special Fund starts operations. Creation of IADB. 
1960 Establishment of IDA under World Bank auspices. Formation of Development 
Assistance group (renamed Development Assistance Committee, DAC, in 1961). 
1961 Kennedy launches Alliance for Progress. 
1963 Clay Report heralds reduction in US aid. Creation of World Food Programme (WFP) - 
major multilateral channel for food aid, but only for projects. WFP has been an 
important pressure for developmental uses of food aid. 
1965 UN Special Fund and EPTA merged to form UNDP. 
1966 PL480 linked to development assistance. 
1968 DAC agrees definition of official development assistance (ODA) (see footnote 10). 
 
 ...continues 
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Table 1 (continued): Chronology of foreign aid. 
1969 Pearson Report proposes 0.7 per cent target for ODA volume. 
1973 Robert McNamara speech launches World Bank reorientation towards poverty. 
1975 International Development and Food Assistance Act (75 per cent of PL480 to 
countries with per capita income of less than US$300). First Lomé convention 
(framework for EC-ACP aid). 
1980 First structural adjustment loans (SAL). 
1982 Start of debt crisis. 
1987 Launch of Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA). Publication of 
Unicef-sponsored study Adjustment with a Human Face. 
1989 World Bank launches governance agenda. 
1990 End of cold war. First Human Development Report (UNDP) and World 
Development Report (World Bank) on poverty: More obvious shifts in donor 
policy toward poverty reduction. 
1994 Copenhagen Summit: 2020 initiative and formulation of what have become DAC 
targets. 
1996  World Bank and the IMF jointly launch a debt relief initiative for the heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC). 
1997 Several donors issue white appears or other policy documents embracing 
partnership. 
 
primary production of all sorts in the colonial area... is... a life and death matter for the 
economy of the country (quoted in Gupta 1975: 320). One Labour MP went so far as to call 
for the rapid development of the colonies so that the UK could become independent of the US 
(ibid.: 321).3 
                                              
3 Gupta argues that there were, however, forces in both the Colonial Office and amongst Labour 
MPs that held this drive to exploitation somewhat in check. 
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Table 2: Schematic overview of main developments in the history of foreign aid. 
 Dominant or rising institutions Donor ideology Donor focus Types of aid 
1940s Marshall Plan and UN system 
(including World Bank). 
Planning. Reconstruction. Marshall Plan was largely 
programme aid. 
1950s United States, with Soviet 
Union gaining importance from 
1956. 
Anti-communist, but with role 
for the state. 
Community Development 
Movement (CDM). 
Food aid and projects. 
1960s Establishment of bilateral 
programmes. 
As for the fifties, with support 
for state in productive sectors. 
Productive sectors (e.g. support 
to the green revolution) and 
infrastructure. 
Bilaterals gave technical 
assistance (TA) and budget 
support; multilaterals supported 
projects. 
Note: 
Entries are main features or main changes. There are of course exceptions. 
...continues 
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Table 2 (continued): Schematic overview of main developments in the history of foreign aid 
 Dominant or rising institutions Donor ideology Donor focus Types of aid 
1970s Expansion of multilaterals 
(especially World Bank, IMF and 
Arab-funded agencies). 
Continued support for state 
activities in productive activities 
and meeting basic needs. 
Poverty, taken as agriculture 
and basic needs (social sectors). 
Fall in food aid and start of 
import support. 
1980s Rise of NGOs from mid-eighties. Market-based adjustment (roll-
ing back the state). 
Macroeconomic reform. Financial programme aid and 
debt relief. 
1990s Eastern Europe and FSU 
become recipients rather than 
donors; emergence of 
corresponding institutions. 
Move back to the state toward 
end of the decade. 
Poverty and then governance 
(environment and gender 
passed more quickly). 
Move toward sector support at 
end of the decade. 
Note: 
Entries are main features or main changes. There are of course exceptions. 
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The continued support of colonial powers, notably Britain and France, to their colonies in the 
post-war period is one of the three main features of the international assistance scheme in that 
period. There was considerable continuity from colonial to post-colonial institutions (an 
obvious example being the renaming of the Colonial Development Corporation as the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation in the sixties) and aid-financed efforts drew from 
the experience of both British and French authorities (as in the case of the Community 
Development Movement).  
 
A major basis for the development of todays aid machinery was international activities in the 
wake of the Second World War. Indeed, several institutions developed from organisations 
originally created to cater for the aftermath of war: Oxfam first catered for refugees from 
Greece and CARE was originally the Centre for American Relief in Europe (the Europe later 
became Everywhere). The development work of the UN began with the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) founded during the war (1943), and the World Bank, 
whose full name is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, began with 
loans for reconstruction, making its first loan to a developing country only in 1950 (to 
Colombia). The final post-war institution of importance was the Marshall Plan, whose evident 
success was seen as a model for development elsewhere, and echoed in the donor coordinated 
effort the Colombo Plan for South and South-Eastern Asia (though the similarities mostly stop 
there). 
 
A final feature of the post-war international scene of importance was the first wave of 
independence, creating a constituency for aid. The first meeting of the non-aligned movement 
in 1955 gave a focus to this voice, as did the various organs of the UN, notably UNCTAD. 
However, as argued below, whilst its existence is the rationale for aid, the recipient community 
has not been successful in their attempts to affect aid policy. 
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US HEGEMONY AND THE MOVE TO BURDEN SHARING 
 
Despite the existence of multilateral programmes, bilateral technical assistance to independent 
countries (mostly in Asia under the Colombo Plan) and even the emergence of the Soviet Aid 
programme in 1956, the 1950s may be described as a decade of US hegemony, as it alone 
accounted for 2/3 of total aid in that decade. Although the programme was subject to 
continued commercial pressures (especially in the use of food aid), the intensification of the 
cold war gave US aid a strongly strategic orientation, which it has retained to this day. Although 
the US aid programme was launched by Truman in his Point Four speech in 1950, the same 
year as the International Development Act, in fact most US aid was released under the tellingly-
named Mutual Security Act of the following year. Aid was quite consciously used to stop 
countries going communist, and development aid and military aid mixed as necessary. 
 
By the mid-fifties, discontent was growing in the US over the aid programme on two counts.4 
First, some, such as Milton Friedman, argued that attempts to buy political support did not 
work; and, since aid went to governments, it was more likely to encourage communisation 
than prevent it. Second, if efforts to stave off communism were successful then the benefits 
from this effort accrued to all members of the Free World so that there should be an equal 
sharing of the burden amongst those countries. 
 
                                              
4 Some authors suggest aid fatigue to be a new phenomenon, but it is easy to find evidence of it 
since almost the start of aid programmes. 
US pressures for burden sharing were one factor behind the establishment of bilateral aid 
programmes at the end of the fifties and in the 1960s, and was the impetus behind the 
formation of the Development Assistance Group in 1960 (becoming DAC in 1961) to monitor 
aid performance and the later adoption of the 0.7 per cent volume target. Another force 
behind the emergence of bilateral programmes was the second wave of independence in the 
1960s, as well as the troubled financial state of some already independent countries (notably 
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India). Finally, new donors emerged as they either or both recognised the benefits to be had 
from an aid programme or from their humanitarian motives. 
 
Changes were also taking place in the form of aid. In the 1950s the Community Development 
Movement (CDM), a forerunner of the Integrated Rural Development Projects of the 1970s, 
had received substantial support from the US. The participatory nature of CDM was deliberately 
intended to counter revolutionary sentiments. But it fell into disrepute by the 1960s, especially 
as Green Revolution technology promised to stave off the looming food shortage in the Asian 
sub-continent. Although ex-colonial powers gave budget support to former colonies for a 
period, their preference was to switch to project aid as was being practised by the new bilateral 
donors. Projects were largely in infrastructure (often big infrastructure) though during the 
course of the decade donors came to accept that they would also support joint ventures and 
100 per cent publicly owned enterprises. 
 
FROM POVERTY TO ADJUSTMENT AND BACK AGAIN 
 
The 1970s saw two conflicting trends: the first oil price shock and falling commodity prices 
required quick disbursing assistance (QDA) which was made available in the first instance by 
the IMF, then by the emergence of import support aid, and by 1980 the start of World Bank 
structural adjustment loans (which are programme aid). These facts are part of the explanation 
for the increasing share of multilateral aid in the 1970s. But at the same time donors 
announced a reorientation towards a greater poverty focus: notably the World Bank  
under (then) President Robert McNamara, but also amongst bilateral donors, such as the UK 
white paper More Aid for the Poorest in 1975 (ODM 1975) and the US International 
Development and Food Assistance Act of the same year, which stipulated that 75 per cent of 
PL480 aid should go to countries with a per capita income less than US$300.5 
                                              
5 PL (public law) 480 food aid refers to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (not to be 
confused with the Agricultural, Trade and Development Assistance Act) passed in the United States in 
1954, which marked the inception of formal food aid programmes. While publicly announced at the 
time as a benign response to developing country needs, its primary purpose, as the name betrays, 
was to help develop new markets for surplus US agricultural output. 
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Although the poverty focus enjoyed a brief period of ascendancy in the late 1970s, the 
emergence of balance-of-payments problems at about the same time and the emergence of the 
debt crisis in the 1980s resolved this conflict in favour of adjustment and aid to adjustment 
(programme aid, including debt relief). As such, the emergence of adjustment lending was not 
a response to a development crisis. In general there was no such crisis, although some African 
countries had begun a downturn. Rather it was a response (though not exclusively) to balance-
of-payments and debt problems, and the attendant risk of financial crisis in developed 
countries (i.e. as a means to avoid collapse of the commercial banks involved). The experience 
thus clearly illustrates how the aid programme may readily respond to the needs and interests 
of the major donors.6 The initial focus on macroeconomic policy also gave the World Bank 
and the IMF, particularly the former, a pre-eminence they had not enjoyed before (hence the 
expression the Washington Consensus). The World Bank is without doubt the most 
important development institution, leading both policy dialogue and increasingly the research 
agenda. Economic crisis in the West and changes in government also led some donors - again 
the UK is an example - to be more open about their intention to use their aid programme for 
their own commercial benefit (apparently not noticing the contradiction between this stance 
and the free market philosophy they espoused). 
 
The eclipse of poverty was not without its critics, which found their most effective voice first 
in the Unicef report State of the Worlds Children (Grant 1990) and the Unicef-financed 
Adjustment with a Human Face (Cornia et al. 1987). These works argued that adjustment 
policies neglected the poor and should be redesigned accordingly.7 By the late 1980s these 
arguments were having some effect and the World Bank began work on designing a poverty 
policy (assisted by the then President, Barber Conable, who emphasised the issue), which 
culminated in the New Poverty Agenda in the 1990 World Development Report (World 
Bank 1990). This publication is often given as the starting point for poverty reappearing on the 
                                              
6 The differing responses of Western governments to the financial crises in East Asia and the natural 
disasters in Central America in late 1998 brings this point home very strongly.  
7 However, the authors of Adjustment with a Human Face did accept the need for adjustment, and did 
not argue that adjustment policies had necessarily harmed the poor. 
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agenda of donor agencies (and agencies have based their strategies on that of the World Bank), 
providing an example of how the World Bank can take over activities as the original initiative 
came from elsewhere and was initially resisted by the World Bank. 
 
POST-COLD WAR ERA AND DONOR DOMINATION 
 
The end of the cold war may be expected to have heralded great changes for aid. There have 
been rather less (and different) changes than many expected, however. For example, aid 
budgets have declined throughout the 1990s, rather than growing as a result of the peace 
dividend as hoped. There have been two changes of note though. First, the disappearance of 
Eastern Europe and the countries of the Former Soviet Union as aid donors and their re-
emergence as recipients. Second, donor concerns about governance. Although still 
inconsistently applied, donors have now awarded or withdrawn aid on the basis of governance 
issues, whereas in the cold war period they happily supported any friendly regime (friendly to 
the West, not necessarily the bulk of the countrys inhabitants). Some countries of former 
strategic importance are no longer so, and have seen their aid fall accordingly.  
 
On the other hand, there has also been remarkable continuity in aid programmes. There were 
arguments in the early 1990s that aid would wither away, and be replaced by financing on 
issues of global importance such as the environment and international security. This does not 
appear to have happened, and there are not strong reasons to think that it is about to do so. It 
may be imagined that the low-income countries of the world, such as those in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, will continue to receive aid for some years to come - making issues of 
aid effectiveness of continuing importance.8 
 
Donors have, as noted, tended to dominate the aid scene. A number of examples may be 
given. Since 1951 there was a campaign for a soft-loan Special UN Fund for Development 
(SUNFED), which was not realised, as the donors preferred instead to place the International 
Development Agency (IDA) under the World Bank. The UN applies one-country one-vote 
                                              
8 For recent contributions to the aid effectiveness debate, see Hansen and Tarp (2000), Lensink and 
White (1999), World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (1997). 
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whereas the developed countries dominate the Bank. The donors club (DAC), which is 
responsible for monitoring aid performance, has no developing country members (even as 
observers); UNCTAD made several attempts to wrest control of aid policy from DAC but was 
unsuccessful. The main country-level co-ordinating mechanism are Consultative Groups (or 
Round Tables) at which the donor community presents the recipient with a report card and 
their latest concerns and conditions. The donor co-ordinating body for support to adjustment 
in Africa, the Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA), has no African representation. 
Yet, it does not have to be like this. The Marshall Plan was administered by a committee 
(Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, OEEC, the forerunner of the OECD), in 
which the donor had no special position over the recipients. Nevertheless, donors have not 
been willing to relinquish control of their aid programmes to developing countries. Although 
donors increasingly talk of partnership, and the need for recipient ownership, they in fact are 
reluctant to allow recipients more than a limited role. 
 
A partial reason for this reluctance is in all likelihood the desire of donors to utilise aid for 
their own ends; a factor that also helps explain the persistence of bilateral aid despite widely 
aired arguments in favour of multilateral institutions. These ends are both political and 
commercial and affect who gets aid and what it may be used for. Hence, as described in 
section 4, donors clearly do not allocate aid solely according to developmental criteria. This 
subordination of aid to other donor objectives is, however, at odds with the notion of policy 
coherence (or consistency), which has been adopted by several donors in the second half of 
the 1990s. 
 
Donor domination has also affected the largely modernist development thinking, which has 
been the basis of aid programmes. Hence, it has been accepted that there is a conception of 
the ideal societal state - basically Western liberal democracy, though the conception of this has 
changed over time - to which developing countries should aspire. The donor community has 
done little to support the search for alternative models of development and even less to 
promote them.9 
                                              
9 See Thorbecke (2000) for recent overview of changes in development thinking since the fifties, and the 
varying role played by foreign aid. 
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3. Aggregate trends in foreign aid 
 
AID VOLUME AND ITS COMPONENTS 
 
Historic trends. Aggregate trends in official development assistance (ODA) to developing 
countries are presented in Chart 1, stretching back to 1967 (full data are given in Appendix 
A).10 Since the early 1970s, there has been a clear upward trend in the real value of foreign aid 
peaking in 1992. Since then, however, aid volumes have seen a marked downfall. In 1997, aid 
in current prices stood at only US$47.9 billions, a drop of 23.7 per cent compared to 1992 
(US$62.7 billions). When measured in constant 1990 prices (in terms of US$), aid dropped by 
21.2 and 19.2 per cent from 1992 to 1996, using the developing country import unit value 
index and the DAC GDP deflator respectively. OECD (1998d) has reported a further drop in real 
terms of 7.1 per cent from 1996 to 1997 (GDP deflated), so that real net ODA in 1997 was 
actually lower than in 1984. 
 
As described in section 2 above, this turnaround in aid flows in the 1990s has followed the end 
of the cold war. New interests, problems and obligations successfully competed for the 
energies and financial resources of the industrial world. Donors also argued that a further 
factor was pressure on the national budgets of donors. A study undertaken by OECD (reported 
in OECD 1997) showed that aid had fallen fastest in those DAC members (e.g. Sweden, Italy and 
Finland) which had been running the largest fiscal deficits while, by contrast, the members 
with the smallest deficits (e.g. Norway, Japan and Ireland) all had increased their aid in real 
terms. However, whilst by 1997 the average budget deficit amongst DAC donors had been 
                                              
10 ODA is defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD to include grants or 
loans to developing countries and territories which are: (i) undertaken by the official sector of the donor 
country, (ii) with promotion of economic development and welfare in the recipient country as the main 
objective, and (iii) at concessional financial terms (i.e., if a loan, have a grant element of at least 25 per . 
In addition to these financial flows, technical co-operation is included in ODA, while grants, loans and 
credits for military purposes are excluded, regardless of their concessionality.  
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reduced to 1.3 per cent of GDP, compared to 4.3 per cent four years earlier, aid has continued 
to fall (German and Randell 1998: 11). 
 
For the reasons discussed previously, the share of multilateral aid has risen from about 23 per 
cent in the 1970s to nearly 30 per cent in the 1990s (see Table 3).11 Leading multilateral donors 
include the World Bank (which has expanded its policy advisory role in the developing world 
side by side its increased financial involvement), the UN agencies (notably the UNDP) and the 
Commission of the European Communities (CEC). A further change is the increasing share of 
grant aid: more than three-quarter of total ODA has been in the form of grants in the period 
1991-96, compared to just over 60 per cent two decades earlier (Table 3). Appendix D gives 
further details (for the 1987-96 period) on aid types, where in particular the high share of 
bilateral aid provided in the form of technical assistance (more than 20 per cent of total ODA in 
recent years) should be noticed.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
11 The share of multilateral aid going to sub-Saharan Africa has increased even more, to more than 40 
per cent by 1994-96 (see Appendix C). 
12 Please note that the disaggregated data produced in Appendix D is drawn from OECDs DAC On-line 
Database, leading to some (small) discrepancies in relation to the data in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Net ODA disbursements, by type and donor, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent) 
 Average share 
1973-80 
Average share 
1981-90 
Average share 
1991-6 
ODA type 
ODA grants 61.6 71.1 77.4 
ODA loans 38.4 28.9 22.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Donor 
Bilateral ODA a 77.2 75.4 70.1 
Multilateral ODA 22.8 24.6 29.9 
o.w. IBRD and IDA 5.6 7.7 8.3 
o.w. IMF (SAF and ESAF) 0.0 0.1 1.3 
o.w. United Nations Agencies 7.5 8.6 9.6 
o.w. CEC 3.4 4.4 7.2 
o.w. Other 6.3 3.8 3.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: There may be (small) discrepancies between the data shown here and the 
disaggregated data produced in Appendix D, since the data in Appendix D is drawn 
from OECDs DAC On-line Database (OECD 1998b). a Including Arab donors.  
Sources: Appendix B, except data for details on multilateral ODA, which is drawn 
directly from OECD (1998a). 
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The relative importance of ODA amongst financial flows has changed over time. There are four 
main components to official and private flows: (i) official development assistance (ODA), (ii) 
other official flows (OOF, consisting of bilaterally and multilaterally channelled flows related to, 
e.g. export and investment transactions), (iii) private flows channelled bilaterally and 
multilaterally at market terms (e.g. foreign direct investment and commercial bank loans), and 
(iv) grants from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In Table 4 these four components 
are displayed for the developing countries as a whole.13 To a considerable extent, the decline in 
ODA flows after 1992 has been compensated by an impressive increase in private flows, which 
followed in the wake of fading debt (and other economic) problems in a number of the larger 
debtor countries (mainly middle-income countries in Latin America and, until recently, parts of 
Asia). In fact, the surge in private flows has meant that these have become (since 1993) by far 
the most important source of financial flows to the developing countries as a whole. After 
having accounted for more than 70 per cent of all net disbursements to the developing 
countries at its peak in 1990, the share of ODA has since steadily declined to only a rough third 
of net disbursements in 1996-97. Correspondingly, since other official flows (e.g. export 
credits) and NGO grants have remained (in relative terms) rather insignificant, the share of 
private flows in net disbursements have soared from a nadir in 1990 of only about 12 per cent 
to around 60 per cent in 1996-97.14 This represents a rather 
 
 
 
 
                                              
13 Note that ODA levels are somewhat higher in Table 4 than in Chart 1, since Table 4 shows aid from 
all donors, not just DAC donors. 
14 In terms of foreign exchange, ODA flows could also illustratively be compared against the revenue 
earned through exports of goods and services. In 1996, for instance, ODA net disbursements of US$61.7 
bn to developing countries remain quite small when set against developing country merchandise exports 
worth US$1, (export data from IMF 1998). 
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Table 4: Total official and private flows to developing countries, net disbursements, all donors, 1987-1997. 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Net disbursements, current prices (US$ billions) 
Official development assistance, ODA 42.6 50.0 48.4 57.4 65.0 68.4 61.6 64.9 65.0 61.7 52.9 
Other official flows, OOF 1.8 4.4 5.5 8.9 7.2 9.3 7.9 10.5 10.0 5.9 3.3 
Private flows 17.3 25.7 32.0 9.9 25.7 34.3 65.3 90.2 89.2 130.4 88.5 
Grants from NGOs 4.0 4.2 4.0 5.1 5.4 6.0 5.7 6.0 6.0 5.6 3.1 
Total 65.7 84.3 89.9 81.3 103.3 118.0 140.5 171.6 170.8 203.6 147.8 
Net disbursements, shares of total (per cent) 
Official development assistance, ODA 64.8 59.3 53.8 70.6 62.9 58.0 43.8 37.8 38.1 30.3 35.8 
Other official flows, OOF 2.7 5.2 6.1 10.9 7.0 7.9 5.6 6.1 5.9 2.9 2.2 
Private flows 26.3 30.5 35.6 12.2 24.9 29.1 46.5 52.6 52.6 64.0 59.9 
Grants from NGOs 6.1 5.0 4.4 6.3 5.2 5.1 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: OECD (1998b). 
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Table 5: Total official and private flows to sub-Saharan African countries, net disbursements, all donors, 1987-1996. 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Net disbursements, current prices (US$ billions) 
Official development assistance, ODA 12.7 14.4 15.3 17.9 17.7 19.1 17.3 18.9 18.5 16.7 
Other official flows, OOF 2.8 2.0 2.1 2.7 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.0 0.1 -0.2 
Private flows -0.1 -1.0 1.7 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.6 2.6 3.5 
Grants from NGOs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 15.4 15.4 19.1 19.5 18.4 20.6 18.8 19.3 21.2 20.0 
Net disbursements, shares of total (per cent) 
Official development assistance, ODA 82.5 93.5 80.1 91.8 96.2 92.7 92.0 97.9 87.3 83.5 
Other official flows, OOF 18.2 13.0 11.0 13.8 6.5 7.8 4.8 5.2 0.5 -1.0 
Private flows -0.6 -6.5 8.9 -5.6 -2.7 -0.5 3.2 -3.1 12.3 7.5 
Grants from NGOs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: OECD (1998b). 
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dramatic change in the taxonomy of financial flows to developing countries, or, to be more 
precise, to some developing countries. 
 
For, if geography and income levels are taken into account, a somewhat different picture 
emerges. Table 5 shows the same breakdown by type of flow for the sub-Saharan African 
countries, where a large segment of the worlds poorest nations are located. As was the case 
for the developing countries as a group, net ODA flows to sub-Saharan countries also peaked in 
1992 with US$19.1 bn, and then declined, although net disbursement at the end of the period 
were still larger (but only just) than in 1987. But since private creditors and investors have been 
much more reluctant to increase their exposure in the sub-Saharan region, in part because of 
remaining debt problems and in part because of an uncertain macroeconomic environment, 
the shortfall in ODA flows has not been compensated by higher private flows. In fact, in 
several years during 1987-96, because previous private debt was still being serviced while no or 
only negligible new private capital was being attracted, private flows were negative. 
Consequently, without question, ODA has continued to be the predominant source of financial 
resources for the poorest developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (and elsewhere), with 
ODA shares always well above 80 per cent of net disbursements.15 
 
The donor effort. The aid volume effort of the international donor community can be seen 
from Charts 1 and 2, where net ODA disbursements are expressed as a ratio of donor GNP. As 
shown in Chart 1, for the DAC donors as a group, this ratio has nearly halved over the last 
three decades, and has been steadily declining since the early 1980s (from 0.38 in 1982 to 0.22 
per cent in 1997). The UN-target of 0.70 per cent thus seems more remote than ever. The 
individual donor effort underlying the poor aid record of 1997 is presented in Chart 2 (with 
data since 1987 given in Appendix E). Only four countries, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands 
and Sweden, have reached (and surpassed) the UN-target of 0.70 per cent, in fact they did so a 
long time ago.16 
                                              
15 Even though data for grants from NGOs were not available, the inclusion of these relatively small 
amounts would not have altered this conclusion. 
16 In 1996, these countries (referred to below as UN-target donors) contributed almost 15 per cent of 
total net ODA disbursements. 
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While the Danish aid effort has continued its upward trend over the last decade,17 however, 
the ODA/GNP ratios of the other UN-target donors have declined somewhat, but remain very 
high by DAC standards. France and Luxembourg, with aid allocations in 1997 of 0.45 and 0.50 
per cent of national GNP respectively, are the only two other donors which come anyway near 
toward meeting the UN-target, although the aid effort in these two countries have been 
characterized by different historical paths (see Appendix E). Thus, while Luxembourg has 
increased its ODA/GNP ratio significantly over the past decade, from 0.17 per cent in 1987 to 
0.50 per cent in 1997, the ratio for France, after having almost reached the UN-target in the 
mid-1990s, has declined for three years in a row. As for the remaining donors (consulting again 
Appendix E), excepting Italy and the United States which appear to be disengaging from the 
aid business altogether,18 the aid volume effort has followed a mixed path. The historic trend is 
increasing in a number of donors, notably Spain, Ireland and Portugal, and also in Austria and 
Switzerland, but otherwise decreasing. 
 
                                              
17 The drop of the Danish ODA/GNP ratio from 1996 to 1997 (from 1.04 to 0.97 per cent) is due to the 
introduction of the new system of national accounts (ENS 95) in 1997, leading to an upward adjustment 
of GNP, which together with other technical factors caused a downward adjustment in the final 
ODA/GNP ratio (OECD 1998d). 
18 This possibility was indeed actively discussed in the US but rejected. 
COMPOSITION AND ALLOCATION OF AID 
 
Sectoral composition. In Table 6, ODA commitments are presented as they have been allocated 
to the various (main) sectors and purposes in recipient countries (complete time-series data in 
Appendix F). A number of relatively clear allocative shifts have occurred during the period 
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observed. There has been a marked switch toward more aid for social infrastructure and 
services (e.g. education, health, water supply and sanitation), in particular after 1992, a 
reflection of the strengthened emphasis by donors on the developmental role of human 
resource capabilities. In recent years more than a quarter of ODA has been committed to this 
sector. Likewise, economic infrastructure and services (e.g. energy, transport and 
communications) has received increased attention and flows (rising to over 20 per cent 1991-
97). 
 
 
 
Table 6: ODA commitments by sector and purpose, DAC donors, 1973-97 (%). 
 Av. share 1973-80 Av. share 1981-90 Av. share 1991-97 
Soc. infrastruc. & serv. 20.8 25.0 26.2 
Ec. infrastruc. & serv. 13.9 18.7 21.8 
Production sectors 22.0 19.7 12.0 
Multisec. (crosscut.) 2.2 3.0 4.7 
Comm. & gen. pro. aid 14.2 16.2 10.0 
Action relating to debt 3.7 4.3 8.8 
Emergency assistance 1.1 1.7 5.3 
Admin. costs of donors n.a. 3.8 a 4.3 
Support to NGOs n.a. 2.2 a 1.3 
Unallocated/unspec. 22.1 7.1 5.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: a Average numbers refer to 1984-90. 
Source: Calculated from Appendix F. Data from OECD (1998b). 
 
Direct donor involvement in the productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry (and 
related activities) as well as trade and tourism, has, on the other hand, diminished significantly 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The diminished role of aid in the area of production is in part 
explained by the increase in the 1980s of an ideological bias against direct support to the 
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productive sector. Also, at least in the better-off developing countries, the decline is related to 
the increased importance of private financing through e.g. foreign direct investments or bond 
and equity issues (OECD 1997). Programme assistance (including food aid), after having played 
an important role in the 1970s and 1980s, has been scaled down considerably (only 10 per cent 
in 1991-97). Finally, relative newcomers in the aid landscape, like multi-sector aid and (more 
permanent) debt relief have steadily expanded their share, accounting for around 5 per cent 
and 9 per cent of ODA commitments, respectively, during 1991-97. 
 
Allocation across regions and income groups. The allocation of aid across geographical regions 
and income groups is presented in Tables 7 and 8 (data in Appendix G1-4). A number of 
points can be drawn from the data. First, regarding geographical allocation, the sub-Saharan 
region is, or has become of high priority (although the large number of countries in this region 
implies that aid money is also more thinly spread), with 30 per cent of total ODA going this way 
in 1991-6, and well over a third of ODA from UN-target donors (Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
and Netherlands). The priority given to the sub-Saharan region must be seen in the context of 
the deep-seated economic problems that have afflicted many countries in this part of the world 
since at least the early 1980s, in combination with a stronger emphasis on the poverty 
orientation of aid on the part of donors. Other regions on the other hand (e.g. North Africa, 
the Middle East, and South and Central Asia), have seen the share of aid flows diminish, in 
part a reflection of their declining political and strategic importance for the allocational 
leitmotif of the larger powers. 
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Table 7: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by geographical region, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
 Net ODA from all donors  Net ODA from UN-target donors a 
 Average share 
1973-80 
Average share 
1981-90 
Average share 
1991-96 
 Average share 
1973-80 
Average share 
1981-90 
Average share 
1991-96 
North Africa 12.7 7.8 7.3  2.7 1.8 1.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.8 28.4 30.0  33.9 41.3 36.6 
South America 3.7 3.5 4.5  8.1 4.3 5.2 
Middle East 13.8 10.4 6.7  0.8 1.5 3.2 
South and Central Asia 16.9 14.5 11.7  22.9 18.2 11.2 
Far East Asia 10.7 10.4 13.4  14.7 9.5 5.3 
Other b 22.3 25.1 26.4  12.8 21.4 31.4 
o.w. Europe 2.0 1.7 4.2  1.2 0.3 4.7 
Total by region 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: a Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. b Includes Europe, Oceania, Central America and geographically unallocated. 
Source: Extracted from Appendix G1-2. Data from OECD (1998a). 
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Table 8: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by income groups, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
 Net ODA from all donors  Net ODA UN-target donors a 
 Average share 
1973-80 
Average share 
1981-90 
Average share 
1991-96 
 Average share 
1973-80 
Average share 
1981-90 
Average share 
1991-96 
LLDCs b 22.8 28.0 26.3  31.9 37.7 33.9 
Other low income c 18.4 19.5 24.0  30.5 25.9 18.6 
Low middle income d 33.2 26.1 25.4  21.0 13.5 14.4 
Upper middle income e 3.6 3.2 3.3  1.0 1.0 2.9 
Higher income f 6.1 5.7 4.0  3.3 2.9 2.3 
Unallocated 15.9 17.5 17.0  12.3 19.0 27.9 
Total by income 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: a Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. b Least Developed Countries. c Countries with per capita GNP<US$765 in 1995. d 
Countries with per capita GNP between US$766 and US$3035 in 1995. e Countries with per capita GNP between US$3036 and US$9385 in 1995. f 
Countries with per capita GNP>US$9385 in 1995. 
Source: Extracted from Appendix G3-4. Data from OECD (1998a). 
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The lower shares of aid going to South America and Far East Asia is largely explained by the 
more pronounced extent of economic development as well as better access to alternative (in 
particular private) sources of finance. The allocation between income groups, to some extent 
closely related to the geographical pattern, shows some differences in donor priorities (Table 
8). While donors at large have allocated just about even shares to the least developed countries 
(LLDCs), other low-income (LICs) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) in 1991-96 
(about a quarter of total ODA), the UN-target donors, during the same period, have allocated a 
substantially higher aid share to LLDCs compared to LICs and LMICs, in fact they have done so 
since the early 1980s. With respect to the allocational pattern among individual donors, section 
4 below discusses in more detail the results and methodologies of the empirical aid allocation 
literature. 
 
THE STRINGS ATTACHED: QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF AID 
 
When foreign aid is supplied to the recipient country, a number of formal conditions are 
usually attached. Four conditions are of particular importance (the 4Ps): payment, 
procurement, projects and policies. That is: (i) ODA loans are provided on the premise that the 
recipient country returns the money with interest according to the financial terms stipulated in 
the loan agreement, (ii) ODA grants and loans can be tied to procurement in the donor country 
or, in case of partial tying, in the donor country as well as a certain number of developing 
countries, (iii) ODA grants and loans may be tied for specific development projects under 
supervision of the donor, and (iv) in the case of programme aid, the money is committed and 
disbursed in accordance with the recipient countrys compliance with an agreed set of policies 
vis-à-vis the domestic economy. Following White and Woestman (1994), the two latter Ps 
(project tying and policy conditionality) cannot be viewed as unambiguously bad features of 
aid delivery, and their occurrence thus cannot be taken to reflect good or bad donor 
performance. The two former Ps (payment and procurement), however, are generally seen (by 
development specialists, recipient country governments and many agency officials) as 
undesirable features of aid flows. Hence we present here data on trends in the financial terms 
(measured by the grant element of aid) and tying status of ODA commitments by DAC donors.19 
                                              
19 The grant element is an indicator of the concessionality (i.e. softness) of the financial terms of a loan 
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Financial terms. One important reason for being concerned with the financial terms of aid 
flows is their subsequent impact on the debt servicing burden of recipient countries, and thus 
on the future sustainability of their balance-of-payments and (given the public nature of aid 
flows) their fiscal balances. This is an issue, which has been accentuated by the debt problems 
in 1980s and (in the case of many low-income countries) also in the 1990s.20 The Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has therefore attempted to set out a successive 
number of targets and conditions to ensure that the concessionality of aid flows remain as high 
as possible.21 The presently applied target stipulates an average grant element of total ODA 
commitments to all developing countries of at least 84 per cent.22 For each donor to satisfy 
these DAC terms recommendations also require that its total aid effort not be significantly 
below the DAC average. To increase concessionality to meet these targets, donors can either 
increase the grant element of ODA loans or reduce the share of loans in total ODA. In Table 9 
(details in Appendix H), a summary of financial terms data for bilateral ODA commitments is 
presented.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
commitment, which combines interest rate, maturity (interval to final repayment) and grace period 
(interval to first repayment of principal capital, i.e. amortization). The grant element is calculated as the 
difference between the face value of the future service payments to be made by the borrower and the 
grant equivalent, and expressed as a percentage of the face value of the loan. The grant equivalent in 
turn measures the present value of a loan, conventionally using a discount rate of 10 per cent. 
20 See Hjertholm, Laursen and White (2000) for a discussion of possible debt problems. 
21 White and Woestman (1994) report on the history of these initiatives, dating back to the late 1960s. 
22 The DAC terms recommendations have in addition set out a number of targets (norms) for aid to the 
least developed countries (LLDCs): The average grant element of annual ODA commitments from each 
donor to each recipient country is set at least 86 per cent, or alternatively at least 90 per cent for the 
LLDCs as a group.  
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Table 9: Bilateral ODA commitments, financial terms data, DAC donors, 1973-96 (per 
cent). 
 Av. 1973-80 Av. 1981-90 Av. 1991-96 
DAC donors 
Grant share of ODA a 33.9 55.0 48.7 
Loan share of ODA  66.1 45.0 51.3 
Grant element of ODA loans 61.0 55.4 59.5 
Grant element of ODA 74.3 80.0 79.1 
    
UN-target donors b 
Grant share of ODA a 72.6 86.5 99.0 
Loan share of ODA  27.4 13.5 1.0 
Grant element of ODA loans 67.1 62.6 43.7 
Grant element of ODA 91.0 95.1 99.5 
Notes: a Grants refer to both ODA grants as well as equity investment and grant-like loans 
since these have a grant element of 100 per cent also. b Denmark, Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden. 
 
As for DAC donors as a group, compared with the 1970s, the average grant element of ODA 
commitments increased to 80 per cent in the 1980s, then dropped slightly in the 1990s, and 
remaining below the agreed target of 84 per cent. This outcome was the result of a markedly 
lower grant element of ODA loans especially in the 1980s, not fully compensated by the 
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otherwise considerable increase in the share of ODA grants. The grant element of aid from the 
UN-target donors, on the other hand, has increased considerably since the 1970s, at that time 
already well above the DAC target, to reach almost 100 per cent in the 1990s, thereby all but 
entirely eliminating the future balance-of-payments and fiscal burden of aid from this source. 
This development did not result from any improvement in the grant element of ODA loans, in 
fact they have worsened significantly during the period observed, but from the reduction of 
the share of aid loans to a mere 1 per cent of total ODA by the 1990s. 
 
When the DAC target on financial terms (0.84 grant element) is combined with the UN-target 
on ODA volume (0.70 per cent of donor GNP) a combined target of 0.59 is produced, as 
suggested by White and Woestman (1994), which takes account of the DAC condition, 
mentioned above, that the financial terms target can only be considered satisfied if the donor 
adheres to the agreed UN-target on ODA volume. In Chart 3 this combined terms-volume 
performance is presented for the 1987-96 period (data in Appendix I). As is clear, DAC donors 
have at large been quite unable to meet this combined target of 0.59, as have the major donors 
Japan, United States, Germany and France, though the latter has performed significantly better 
than the former three. It would thus appear that some donors which have been calling to 
attention their preparedness to substantially increase the grant element of their ODA (and have 
indeed done so), have also been those donors, which have substantially reduced their aid effort 
in volume terms (thus the money may be cheaper now, but there also is a lot less of it!). 
 
The combination of a substantial volume effort and almost exclusive use of ODA grants to 
channel this effort, on the other hand, has placed the UN-target donors well above the DAC 
combined target. A burden-sharing problem seems to loom in the background here. 
 
Aid tying. Since foreign aid for the most part is financed out of donors national budgets it 
faces competition with other claims on public resources. This creates opportunity costs to the 
national economy in terms of forgone consumption and investment. Donor governments have 
therefore felt justified to reduce at least the balance-of-payments cost of their aid by requiring 
recipient countries to purchase aid-financed goods from the donor country, subject to some 
safeguards of appropriate quality and prices (DAC guidelines allow a 10 per cent margin, i.e. 
mark up over world market prices, although data suggest rather higher margins may be 
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observed in practice). The underlying assumption has been that it is easier to maintain public 
and parliamentary support for major aid programmes if immediate tangible benefits are seen to 
accrue to the national economy of the donor.23 Economists and multilateral  
institutions have argued, however, that aid tying is a potential source of economic distortions, 
especially in cases where the donor is overly concerned with promotion of home exports.24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
23 While the political rationale may be valid, it is uncertain, however, whether there are any significant 
macroeconomic benefits to the donor economy, given the relatively modest order of magnitude in most 
cases (OECD 1985). 
24 The danger of economic distortions may arise from (i) a bias towards projects with a larger import 
contents in areas of particular export interest to the donor, (ii) corresponding bias against projects and 
programmes with a lower import contents, such as rural development projects, and in particular against 
local-cost financing, (iii) a bias against commercially interesting developing countries, (iv) donor 
reluctance to co-operate and co-ordinate their aid activities with other donors who may be seen as 
competitors in the search for commercially attractive projects, (v) impaired credibility of donors in the 
development policy dialogue with recipients, and (vi) donor reluctance to channel aid through 
multilateral institutions (OECD 1985: 241-42).  
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Table 10: Bilateral ODA commitments, share of untied aid, DAC donors, selected 
years 1981-97 (per cent). 
 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 
Austria 3.4 3.0 3.1 44.8 60.6 
Australia 60.0 53.4 10.4 41.9 63.1 
Belgium 29.0 37.5 n.a. n.a. 49.9 
Canada 18.0 42.3 41.4 61.9 33.4 
Denmark 63.6 60.4 n.a. n.a. 71.6 
Finland 84.9 80.9 20.8 59.0 76.8 
France 42.5 42.5 47.8 31.5 n.a. 
Germany 74.3 3.7 33.8 47.9 n.a. 
Ireland n.a. 100.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 71.6 16.6 9.1 43.1 45.6 
Japan 36.8 60.8 70.2 83.9 99.6 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 95.2 
Netherlands 57.3 60.3 45.8 n.a. 90.0 
New Zealand 36.4 78.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Norway 73.6 70.3 71.3 81.8 91.1 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 63.8 99.1 
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sweden 84.0 68.8 71.1 85.0 74.5 
Switzerland 50.1 67.3 74.9 91.4 94.9 
United Kingdom 20.5 27.6 24.0 35.2 71.7 
United States 33.4 40.9 34.9 37.4 n.a. 
DAC donors total 44.1 47.3 43.8 57.9 87.6 
Source: Appendix J. Data from OECD (1998b). 
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Moreover, tied aid is hardly compatible with OECD/DACs stated objectives in such areas as 
enhanced competition, reduced intervention in markets and withdrawal from subsidies. Ideally, 
aid recipients should therefore have a free choice of the most appropriate and economic 
source of supply, benefiting thereby from the advantages of international bidding (OECD 
1985). Donors have therefore acknowledged (in principle) the higher value of untied aid for 
the recipient country and that economic distortions may thereby be reduced (OECD 1992).25 
 
In spite of this, the tying of ODA remains a prominent feature of the aid effort of many donors, 
as is shown in Table 10 (data in Appendix J). Although the share of total untied DAC aid has 
increased steadily from 40-5 per cent in the early 1980s to about 70 per cent in 1995-6, and 
even 88 per cent in 1997, some donors have been unwilling to move decisively towards DAC 
recommendations and continue to tie substantial amounts of their aid.26 For example, if a 
good performance in 1996 where defined as one where the donor ties no more than 30 per 
cent of bilateral aid, only eight donors (some quite small in volume terms) would qualify, and 
in 1997 only ten. Moreover, some of the good performers only became so recently, having 
tied substantial amounts of aid throughout the 1980s. The (un)tying performance tends, 
however, to change quite a bit over time, as the share of untied aid of individual donors is 
prone to considerable swings (see Appendix J). It is not an easy task to explain the variation of 
tying across time and donors, but if anything DAC recommendations is evidently not the only, 
let alone the main guiding principle. In many cases, changes in aid tying are probably closely 
linked to changes in the international competitiveness of home businesses, as suggested by 
White and Woestman (1994), with Japan in recent years (competitive and less tying) and the 
United Kingdom in the eighties (less competitive and more tying) being good examples. In 
                                              
25 Estimates vary, but the extra costs that tied-aid recipients may incur as a result of uncompetitive (and 
thus over) pricing may be as high as between 10-25 per cent (see, e.g. Bhagwati 1967 and Riddell 1987), 
costs, which can be expected to disappear once tying is discontinued. 
26 As noted by the OECD (1994), the overall reduction of tied aid is more a result of an increase in the 
naturally untied components of aid, such as programme aid and emergency aid, than a reduction in tied 
project aid. 
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other cases though, such as Germany (internationally competitive, but substantial tying 
nevertheless), other factors may be involved as well.27 
 
Analogous to the combined terms-volume performance, the real extent of DAC donors 
untied aid performance (UAP) can be gauged by combining the amount of untied aid in per 
cent of bilateral commitments with the ODA/GNP ratio, thus arriving at a volume corrected 
ratio of untied aid. Based on such combined data, Appendix J and K makes possible a 
comparison of donor rankings based on UAP and the performance corrected by the volume 
effort of donors (Table 11). Although some data is missing (some donors reporting 
performance is rather erratic), it is instructive to see, e.g., that the top UAPs of Japan and 
Portugal look a lot less impressive when account is taken of the fact that these donors do not 
provide much aid relative to their economies. On the other hand, the UAPs of donors like 
Norway and Netherlands, already far above the average, look even more distinguished when 
their high ODA/GNP ratios are considered. Denmark also performs substantially better (from 
rank 11 to 3) when the UAP is held against the Danish ODA/GNP ratio of almost 1 per cent. 
There are of course also the bad untied aid performers (e.g. Canada, Italy, Belgium, Australia 
and Austria), who remain so on a combined basis because they provide relatively little aid, and 
tie a lot of it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
27 The extent to which less competitive home businesses can in parctice influence the aid and tying 
policy of the donor government may be a factor here. 
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Table 11: Untied and comb. Untied-vol. performance, donor ranking, 1997. 
 Donor ranking 
 UAP: untied aid in % of  Comb. untied-volume 
Canada 16  15 
Italy 15  16 
Belgium 14  14 
Austria 13  13 
Australia 12  12 
Denmark 11  3 
UK 10  11 
Sweden 9  4 
Finland 8  7 
DAC donors 7  10 
Netherlands 6  2 
Norway 5  1 
Switzerland 4  6 
Luxembourg 3  5 
Portugal 2  8 
Japan 1  9 
France  n.a.    n.a.  
Germany  n.a.    n.a.  
Ireland  n.a.    n.a.  
New Zealand  n.a.    n.a.  
Spain  n.a.    n.a.  
USA  n.a.    n.a.  
Note: a Since the denominator of the UAP is bilateral ODA commitments and the 
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A DIAGRAMMATIC SYNTHESIS: AID DIAMONDS 
 
We can combine four aspects of aid quality into a single figure called an aid diamond. 
Examples are given for Sweden and the US in Chart 4 (and those for the other DAC donors 
given in Appendix L). There are four axis to the diamond, which represent: (1) aid volume, 
measured as a per cent of donor GNP; (2) the grant element; (3) the share to least developed 
countries (LLDCs) and; (4) the percentage of aid which is untied. Aid quality is seen to be 
higher, the higher each of these figures are. Thus, the better a donors aid programme, the 
larger the diamond. Each figure combines donor performance with the DAC average and the 
DAC target. In the case of tying there is no DAC target (as there is, say, for 0.70 per cent of GNP 
for aid volume) so the target is set at 100 per cent. The DAC target for aid to LLDCs is 0.15 per 
cent of GNP. We have converted this figure to the share of a donors aid, which would have to 
go to LLDCs in order to meet this target by dividing through by the donors ODA to GNP ratio. 
If a donors ratio is less than 0.15 per cent of GNP (e.g. the US in the most recent period), then 
they would have to give over 100 per cent of their aid to LLDCs to meet the DAC target. In such 
cases the diamond for the DAC target is truncated at the 100 per cent point. 
 
The examples given clearly illustrate how the quality of US aid has declined over time. They 
also show clearly the comparatively higher quality of Swedish aid. Looking at the performance 
of all donors (Appendix L) within each of the four aspects of aid quality, the diamonds depict 
plainly the extent to which too many donors are far removed from the recommendations and 
targets jointly set out by the Development Assistance Committee. So when discussing the 
growth and development effectiveness of foreign aid (see, e.g. Hansen and Tarp 2000 and 
Lensink and White 1999), it is worth thinking about the role of the poor aid delivery 
performance of donors. 
 
It must be remembered that all four aspects of aid flows are identified precisely because of 
their implications for the economic growth potential of the donor effort. The aid volume 
effort (measured by the ODA/GNP ratio) derives its significance from its potential for filling (or 
closing) gaps in domestic financial resources (see Hjertholm, Laursen and White 2000). The 
concessionality of aid (measured by the grant element) derives significance from its role in 
determining the future debt service burden of recipients, a factor, which we know have 
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important ramifications for the development effects of macroeconomic management. The 
allocation of aid to the poorest countries (the LLDC share) derives its twin-rationale from 
observing the disproportional existence of needs in these countries, and the belief that higher 
aid-induced growth rates could yield disproportionately higher welfare gains for the poor. 
Finally, the untying of aid is seen as a way of increasing the cost effectiveness of aid-financed 
imports. 
 
4. Donor objectives and aid allocation: survey of the literature 
 
Section 3 indicated that the allocation of foreign aid between income groups changes over 
time and across different donor groups. No details were provided, however, on the allocational 
behaviour of individual donors, and yet such behaviour is prone to more differences from one 
donor to another than is revealed by the average figures. Of interest to economists working 
with aid issues has thus been to explain the allocative patterns of donor aid and their 
determining factors. Not only altruistic, but certainly also political, strategic and commercial 
concerns play a part in shaping donors allocational motives and decisions, and such concerns 
have been extensively discussed in the literature (for references see the survey papers by White 
and McGillivray 1995 and McGillivray and White 1993a). Three aspects of the allocational 
pattern of aid have occupied economists. One is the question of whether aid is properly 
allocated between recipients, the benchmark usually being that lower per capita income should 
generate higher per capita aid inflows. This type of analysis is termed descriptive (or 
evaluative). The second type of analysis is explanatory in nature, asking why donors allocate 
aid the way they do it. The third type is normative in nature, seeking to prescribe how aid 
donors should allocate their aid. Below the current state of analysis within each of these 
investigative areas is reviewed. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS28 
 
There are three steps in descriptive analysis, two of which are methodological and the third 
empirical. First the most relevant variables on which to base the construction of performance 
                                              
28 The following draws on the survey paper by White and McGillivray (1995). 
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indicators has to be chosen. Next there is the (perhaps main) methodological issue of how to 
determine which particular indicators most appropriately measure the allocational performance 
of donors. And finally, the comparative performance of donors is evaluated, using the most 
suitable indicators and available data. As indicated above, the variable used for assessing aid 
allocation is typically income per capita. Methodologically, there are both pros and cons for 
using this variable, though with the former by and large outweighing the latter.29 The variable 
measuring the volume effort of each donor should take account of the population size of the 
recipient, so aid per capita is usually used. Moreover, since disbursements and commitments 
may differ considerably (McGillivray and White 1993a), a choice has to be made regarding 
what type of aid flows to use. If attention is on donor performance, the appropriate flow type 
would be commitments, given the immediate control the donor exercises over this variable. If 
attention is on assessing actual amounts transferred, disbursements are more appropriate. 
 
Having decided on the relevant variables, the methodological issue is how to integrate these 
variables into a single indicator of performance. A way of doing this would simply be to 
calculate correlation or regression coefficients between aid and income per capita measures. 
Such calculations (for 1990) have been reported in White and McGillivray (1995).30 Quite 
different rankings of donors emerge, however, depending on whether correlations or 
regressions are employed, suggesting already the need for care in choosing the appropriate 
indicator.31 In identifying appropriate performance indicators, four desirable properties (which 
                                              
29 See White and McGillivray (1995) for discussion of the pros and cons of using income per capita for 
constructing performance indexes. 
30 Similar calculations are found in Bhagwati (1972) and Little and Clifford (1965). 
31 For instance, only three of the top six performers in the correlation ranking appeared among the top 
six performers in the regression ranking (namely Italy, Canada and the United Kingdom). Of the 
remaining three top performers in the correlation ranking, Denmark (third) ranked only 9th in the 
regression ranking, Finland (fourth) only 13th and Switzerland (first) only 12th. When average ranks 
were are used, the top six performers were, in order of rank, Italy, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, 
France, and Denmark. The United States was able to maintain its bottom position through a consistent 
bias against the poorer countries. 
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emerge from examining the methodological usefulness of correlation and regression 
coefficients) should be sought after. 
 
First, the indicator should not be allowed to by improved by regressive reallocation of aid. 
This happens if the shifting of aid from a (larger) poor country to a (smaller) less-poor country 
improves the performance indicator, and the problem is present when using correlation or 
regression coefficients. The reason is that the aid per capita allocation of the smaller less-poor 
country improves more than the larger poor countrys allocation worsens, so that the small 
country moves closer to the regression/correlation line than the larger country moves away, 
and hence the coefficient improves.32 Second, the indicator must not exhibit anti-
concentration bias. But correlation and regression coefficients may obscure (penalize if you 
will) cases where donors wish to concentrate aid in fewer selected countries for efficiency, or 
other, reasons. The poor countries thus not receiving aid (which we could, but would not want 
to exclude from the sample, inter alia for reasons of comparability) would produce a 
deterioration in the performance indicator.33 Third, the indicator must be, and the regression 
coefficient is not, scale neutral. If the indicator is not scale neutral, then if a donor increases 
its aid to all recipients by the same factor (σ), each recipient country receives more aid but in 
the context of the same allocational pattern, and yet the regression coefficient will have 
changed (βafter = σβbefore). This points to a genetic, and undesirable bias in favour of the larger 
                                              
32 Regressive reallocation may be acceptable, though, if the poorer country is (somehow) seen as getting 
too much aid. 
33 A further troublesome aspect of the correlation coefficient is its insensitivity to progressive aid 
allocation, by which is meant its inability to distinguish donor aid spread just about evenly across 
recipients with no particular regard to income and aid which is highly concentrated in the poorest 
countries relative to the less poor This problem stems from fact that achieving a maximum aid 
performance (i.e. a coefficient of -1) can come from any allocation satisfying ai = α - βYi, where ai is aid 
per capita received by recipient i and Yi is income per capita of the recipient. The only requirement is 
therefore that aid allocations must lie along a straight line with a negative slope, rendering the actual 
values of α and β inconsequential. 
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aid programmes. Fourth, the indicator must not be allowed to be maximized by giving all aid 
to a single country (single recipient maximization).  
 
Selecting appropriate indicators should take account these properties, that is, as far as possible, 
since we do not yet have indicators which can adhere to all four criteria. Regression and 
correlation coefficients cannot be relied on, the former because it satisfies none of the criteria, 
the latter because it only satisfies scale neutrality and single recipient maximization. Other 
candidates which have been advanced in the literature are (i) Suits index, (ii) the Headcount 
indicator, (iii) McGillivrays Performance Index (MPI), and (iv) the Adjusted Performance 
Index (API).  
 
The Suits index is related to Lorenz-curve type analysis. One way in which the Lorenz-curve 
may be applied to the analysis of aid allocation, was suggested by Mosley (1987). Mosley 
analysed the world income re-distributive effects of aid, by comparing Gini coefficients, and 
under the assumption that the redistribution of income (in the form of aid) from rich donors 
to poor recipients will effect an upwards shift in the Lorenz curve towards the 45 degree line 
of perfect equality. Mosleys calculations (based on un-weighted averages of per capita income) 
for the 1970-80 period showed only an insignificant improvement in the Gini coefficient (from 
0.461 to 0.453) resulting from the transfer of (total) aid.34 Apart from the fact that calculating 
all the Gini coefficients needed for year-to-year and donor comparisons requires a lot of time, 
scale neutrality is not satisfied when using the Lorenz curve in this way.  
 
An alternative Lorenz curve, which is scale neutral, combines donors cumulative aid shares 
and recipient population shares (ranked by income). The Gini coefficients emerging from this 
Lorenz curve, termed Suits index35, will converge towards -1 as aid is progressively allocated to 
                                              
34 A similar result (Gini down from 0.754 to 0.752), using bilateral aid only, was obtained by White and 
McGillivray (1995). 
35 Named after Daniel B. Suits, who used this index in an analysis of the measurement of tax 
progressivity (Suits 1977). 
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poorer countries and toward 1 as aid is allocated toward better off countries.36 Clark (1991) 
used this indicator to examine the aid allocations of Japan and the United States in 1986, 
finding Japanese aid to be concentrated in lower-income countries and US aid concentrated in 
middle-income countries.37 Looking at the top six recipients of Japans aid, all were located in 
the Asian region, indicating also a strong commercial tendency.38 The six top recipients of US 
aid (accounting for 66 per cent of US aid in 1986) were all of strategic importance at the time 
(to a greater or lesser extent), suggesting security concerns as a major motivation for US aid 
allocation.39  
 
                                              
36 See White and McGillivray (1995) for a formal presentation of this point. 
37 The middle-income bias of US aid was confirmed in a subsequent study (Clark 1992), which looked at 
the allocation pattern of 18 DAC donors in 1987. Excepting Austria and a few other donors with slight 
middle-income bias (e.g. Japan, former West Germany and France), aid from other DAC donors (and 
multilateral agencies) was found to be more highly concentrated in poorer recipient countries.  
38 Top recipients of Japanese aid in 1986, in order of importance, were China, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Bangladesh, Burma, and India. 
39 Top recipients of US aid in 1986, in order of importance, were Israel, Egypt, the Philippines, El 
Salvador, Pakistan, and Honduras. 
Similarly, White and McGillivray (1995), ranked 19 DAC donors according to the size of Suits 
index in 1990, using the same data underlying the correlation and regression calculations 
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reported earlier. Interestingly, all but one of the top six correlation/regression performers 
Denmark) were located in the bottom half of performers or in the middle group, while Sweden 
(first), Belgium (second), Norway (fourth), Switzerland (fifth) and Finland (sixth) took their 
places. So quite different results are obtained when using Suits index, perhaps excepting the 
rare consistency of the bottom performance of the United States. While not subject to the 
regressive reallocation and anti-concentration bias problems, Suits index can be maximized, 
however, by allocating all aid to one small poor country. Thus, Suits index satisfies all but one 
of the four desired properties stated above, ranking this performance indicator high among 
appropriate candidates.  
 
The Headcount indicator is generated from the same line of analysis, except that only increases 
in aid to the most poverty-stricken countries (say, the 40 per cent poorest countries in the 
sample) can improve performance. Reporting once again on the ranking exercise conducted by 
White and McGillivray (1995), five of the top performers according to Suits index were also 
found among the Headcount top performers, the newcomer being Italy (replacing Finland). 
The Headcount indicator basically satisfies the same three criteria, as does the Suits index, 
(falling short also on the single recipient maximization criteria). However, it does not capture 
distributional patterns within the low-income group, and may thus fail to reprimand donor 
negligence of the very poorest members of the low-income group. Moreover, by nature, this 
indicator is no guide with respect to the allocation pattern within the remaining (say, 60 per 
cent) of aid recipients. And besides, the 40-60 per cent division may not even be the most 
appropriate, this being a matter of judgement. On these grounds, the Suits index may 
reasonably be preferred over the Headcount indicator.  
 
The performance indicator proposed by McGillivray (1989) (MPI) is a poverty-weighted index 
of aid per capita from donor A to recipient B over aid per capita from donor A to all 
recipients. The poorest recipients are ascribed a weight of 100, and the richest a weight of 0 (so 
the single recipient maximization criteria is not satisfied). The top six performers according to 
McGillivrays MPI over the 1969-84 period included three donors (Finland, Denmark and 
Switzerland) also found in White and McGillivrays 1990 ranking based on the same indicator. 
It also includes five donors found in White and McGillivrays Suits index and Headcount 
rankings (for 1990). While scale neutral and not anti-concentration biased, as required, the fact 
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that MPI uses un-weighted averages of aid per capita means that performance may in some 
cases be improved by regressive aid reallocation.40  
 
To amend this drawback, McGillivray (1992), introduced population weights, to arrive at an 
adjusted performance indicator (API) no longer subject to the regressive reallocation effect 
(though still influenced by single recipient maximization). This adjustment resulted in a 1984-
ranking not substantially different from the ranking based on the unadjusted MPI, or the Suits 
and Headcount rankings for that matter. Thus, comparing the various rankings described 
above, excepting those based on correlation and regression coefficients, one repeatedly finds 
the Nordic donors, Switzerland and Belgium among the top performers and the United States 
among the worst performers. These results suggest at least some degree of consistency among 
the top and bottom rankings generated from the various indicators. 
 
When held against the four criteria, having satisfied three of these, only the Suits index and the 
API can reasonably be expected to adequately measure aid allocational performance (as noted, 
the Headcount, while also satisfying three criteria, suffers from a lack of information on 
allocational patterns within and outside the poorest group of recipients).  
 
EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS41 
 
Studies using explanatory analysis seek to understand why donors allocate aid the way they do 
it. Sharing a common reference to the political economy literature, these studies usually treat 
aid as a foreign policy instrument applied to (help) achieve a range of political, strategic, 
economic, as well as genuinely humanitarian objectives. The basic assertion of explanatory 
analysis is that the pursuit of these objectives will motivate donors to allocate their foreign aid 
in such a way as to be conducive (in the eyes of the donor) to the attainment of these 
objectives. Since information on the motives themselves are not readily available, explanatory 
analysis aims at the decision-making process of turning motives into allocations. The 
                                              
40 See White (1992) for this point. 
41 The following draws on the survey paper by McGillivray and White (1993a). 
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underlying assumption is that the donor will allocate aid to those recipients, which are seen to 
exhibit the characteristics (be they economic, political, strategic, or other), which are believed 
by the donor to be consistent with its own motivations. The methodology thus involves 
establishing viable hypotheses relating aid flows to the observed characteristics of recipient 
countries, and an empirical verification exercise, often using some form of multiple regression 
analysis, and often (but not always) using cross-country data. Quite a few different approaches 
have been attempted to explain observed aid allocations (see McGillivray and White 1993a).  
 
A dominant strand of explanatory studies has sought to look separately at recipient needs (RN) 
and donor interests (DI) by estimating two models of aid allocation. Such studies include early 
work by Wittkopf (1973), McKinlay and Little (1977; 1978a, 1978b; 1979), and McKinlay 
(1978) and more recent work by Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Tsoutsoplides (1991). The 
RN model assumes a basically altruistic perspective on the part of the donor, expecting aid to 
be solely allocated according to the economic and social requirements of recipient countries. 
The DI model, on the other hand, takes a more sombre perspective, assuming that donors ship 
aid for the purpose of promoting their foreign policy objectives and economic self-interest. 
The general tendency of the empirical evidence pertaining to the three decades prior to the 
1990s suggest serious doubt about the extent to which the recipient need model can explain 
aid allocations from bilateral donors. Not unexpectedly, however, multilateral aid allocation (in 
1978-80), was comparatively well explained by the RN model estimated by Maizels and 
Nissanke (43 per cent of the variation). This may be partly explained by the fact that 
multilateral agencies are less governed by political considerations than bilateral agencies, a 
point investigated by Rodrik (1996). 
 
McKinlay and Little (1979) reached a similar conclusion with regard to US aid in 1960 and 
1970, stating that humanitarian concerns were all but absent in US aid allocation, this instead 
being shaped wholly by US self-interest. The evidence obtained by Tsoutsoplides (1991), 
however, does not reject the RN model in his estimation of total European aid (averaged for 
1975-80), in fact it performed better than the DI model, although the performance reverses 
when only bilateral aid is considered. Since economic and commercial considerations may 
reasonably be assumed to as high in most European donors as in the United States, one may 
speculate whether the strategic concerns of the US at the time can explain the different 
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conclusions reached by Tsoutsoplides and the studies by Maizels and Nissanke and McKinlay, 
since the latter two include the relatively large US aid programme. The pure developmental 
models are half-related to the RN/DI paradigm, in that only recipient needs (examples of 
which have been given earlier) are thought to explain aid allocation, with donor interests left 
out. A recent such study is Anyadike-Danes and Anyadike-Danes (1992).42 
 
Another strand of studies have used so-called hybrid models, which specify variables meant 
to capture both the political and strategic importance of the recipient, its economic and 
commercial significance and its development requirements. So these models are usually quite 
comprehensive. A recent study by Grilli and Riess (1992), for example, of the determinants of 
European aid to associated developing countries (ACPs), used the Human Development Index 
(HDI)43 as an indicator of recipient needs, with external debt stocks added as an additional 
indicator of financial distress.44 Exports to donor countries measured commercial importance, 
while population size was included in order to account for small country bias. The results 
obtained indicated that European bilateral aid allocation had, until recently, been heavily 
influenced by commercial considerations. In the 1980s, however, a gradual shift towards 
recipient needs was identified. European multilateral aid allocations, on the other hand, while 
somewhat affected by commercial interests early in the 1970s, have since been much more 
guided by considerations for development requirements. Reflecting on the reasons for the 
generally better explanatory power of the adopted model over time, Grilli and Riess suggested 
the declining role of colonial ties and other (political) factors. However, political and strategic 
motives are not explicitly tested for, but while the extent to which these factors influence aid 
                                              
42 Early such studies include Edelman and Chenery (1977), Kaplan (1975), and Henderson (1971). 
43 Whether or not the Human Development Index is a suitable indicator of development is a moot 
point. See McGillivray (1991) for a critical assessment. 
44 Since debt stocks measured in nominal US$ do not capture the relative burden of foreign debt, a more 
correct indicator from a conceptual point of view would have been the debt-to-export or the debt-to-
GNP ratio. 
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allocations has surely diminished since the demise of the cold war, security consideration may 
nevertheless have played a role in some cases.45  
 
Yet other studies (e.g. Daveri and Grilli 1991 and DAgostino 1989) on the allocational pattern 
of individual donors found evidence of a polar pattern among them. At one end, French aid 
appeared entirely guided by French interest, and at the other, Dutch and Nordic aid appeared 
to be driven almost wholly by recipient needs.46 In between these contrasting cases were found 
donors like the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. Supporting the notion of a very divers 
pattern of aid allocation among donors, the recent study by Alesina and Dollar (1998) of 
bilateral aid allocation during 1970-94, found evidence that the direction of foreign aid is 
                                              
45 Several early studies have explicitly modelled such political factors. For instance, when analysing aid 
allocations from the United States, the United Nations and the World Bank in the 1960s, Levitt (1968), 
used population size, income per capita, electrical consumption, school attendance, and foreign 
exchange reserves as development criteria. The commercial significance of recipients was measured by 
US exports to recipients, while their strategic and political importance was captured by their share of US 
military aid and a friendliness index measuring their UN voting behaviour. Wittkopf (1972), on the 
other hand, used income per capita and the trade balance as indicators of development needs, combined 
with export growth as an indicator of economic performance (on the assumption that the donors under 
investigation - France, Germany, UK and the United States - were concerned with the optimal return of 
aid flows, in turn thought to be higher among stronger economies). Population size, year of 
independence, donor-recipient trade, geographic proximity to a communist state, and trade and aid 
relations with the commumist bloc were all included as indicators of political and strategic importance. 
In addition, reminiscent of the band wagon effect introduced in later studies, Wittkopf included other 
bilateral and multilateral aid flows in order to capture the degree of coordination and labour sharing 
among donors. Kato (1969) also introduced a couple of (conceptually flawed) indicators measuring the 
state of the donor economy (in this case the United States), namely the US balance-of-payments deficit 
and its aid-GNP ratio. Other studies along hybrid lines using political and strategic indicators include 
Loehr, Price and Raichur (1976) and Bowles (1989; 1987). 
46 A recent study on Danish aid by Tarp et al. (1998), while confirming the importance of recipient 
needs in the determination of Danish aid allocations, also found evidence of commercial interests, as 
well as increased political pre-occupation with human rights. Evidence of an increased role of political 
developments in recipient countries have also been found by Alesina and Dollar (1998).  
 
 -49- 
dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than by economic needs and 
policy performance of the recipients. Aid from the United States, France and Japan 
(accounting for a very large share of total aid) largely went to friendly countries, regardless of 
economic needs and performance, with Nordic aid much more sensitive to these factors. The 
authors propose that this pattern of aid flows partly explains why past aid has been, at best, 
only partially successful at promoting growth and reducing poverty in recipient countries. 
While recipients that have democratised have, at the margin, received more aid, a colonial past 
and political alliances have been the major determinants of aid flows. Put in its extreme, the 
authors state that an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former 
colony friendly to its former colonizer, receives more  foreign aid than another country with 
similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.47 
 
A couple of studies (e.g. Dowling and Hiemenz 1985, Isenman 1976 and Karunaratne 1980) 
have highlighted, and sought to explain the small country bias often observed in donors aid 
programmes (there also being a possibility of middle-income biases), by which is meant the 
tendency for small recipient countries to receive relatively larger amounts of aid per capita than 
larger countries. Other studies have focussed on the role played by the bureaucratic structure 
of aid agencies, in particular the tendency to merely add a few per cent over last-year allocation 
in order to arrive at the current-year allocation. This type of inertia can no doubt be related to 
the fact that downward adjustments (or even stagnation) in aid allocations, in particular for 
projects, may put a strain on donor-recipient relations and co-operation, not something that 
makes aid policy implementation easier. Gulhati and Nallari (1988) exemplified this approach 
in their analysis of three selected country aid programmes of seven DAC donors and IDA. While 
similar to the hybrid models in the choice of variables and the DI/RN paradigm in estimating 
two models, the innovative feature is the attempt to capture bureaucratic inertia by specifying a 
                                              
47 Contrasting such factors as colonial ties with a superior policy stance (with the former thought not to 
enhance the development effectiveness of aid and the latter to do just that), reflects the notion, 
advanced by Burnside and Dollar (1997) and World Bank (1998), that the growth effectiveness of aid is 
intimately linked with good macroeconomic policies. In response to this, Hansen and Tarp (2000) and 
Lensink and White (1999) have shown that this link has not been adequately documented in the studies 
referred to. 
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lagged dependent variable for aid allocation and using time-series data. The results obtained 
for the 1970-84 period showed a marked tendency for incremental and country-bound aid 
allocation to characterize decision-making in bilateral aid agencies (while not in IDA). Based on 
a more formal framework of aid adjustment in the Indian context, similar results was obtained 
by Gang and Kahn (1990), who found the size of aid in the previous-year to be a significant 
determinant of the size of aid in the current-year.48 
 
                                              
48 McGillivray (1986) and Gounder (1991) have examined the extent of bureaucratic inertia in Australian 
aid along similar lines. 
A conceptually different perspective, is proposed by the sample selection models (a sub-set of 
the limited dependent variable models). The basic idea is that aid allocation results from at 
two-step decision-making process. The first step involves deciding which countries to include 
in the aid programme, and the next step involves determining how much aid the countries 
chosen should receive. In the seminal work by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) DAC aid in 
1970 was analysed in this fashion. The authors found aid eligibility and amounts to depend on 
recipient needs (i.e. income per capita, population size and income per capita), on donor 
economic and political self-interest, and the band wagon effect, that is the tendency to 
allocate aid to countries already receiving aid from other donors. Several more recent studies, 
building on (and extending) the original Dudley and Montmarquette framework have 
appeared, most of them designed to analyse aid allocation of individual donors like Canada 
(Dudley and Montmarquette 1978), Australia (McGillivray and Oczkowski 1991), the United 
States (Gang and Lehman 1990 and Eggelston 1987), the United Kingdom (McGillivray and 
Oczkowski 1992), and Denmark (Tarp et al. 1998). Trumbull and Wall (1994), using also an 
extended version of the Dudley-Montmarquette model, performed an analysis of total 
developing country ODA for 1984-89. 
 
In an attempt to assess the robustness and credibility of the empirical results obtained in the 
explanatory literature, McGillivray and White (1993a) has devoted considerable space to a 
critical assessment of the methodological properties of the various statistical models adopted 
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in these studies. A central flaw of much of the literature, it is argued, is the inadequate 
attention given to the proper description (i.e. approximation) of the actual decision-making 
processes governing aid allocation. The complex interplay of bureaucratic, political, 
commercial and other factors, which characterize donor-recipient relations are rarely 
sufficiently appreciated and accounted for. This fundamental deficiency is almost certain to 
influence the reliability of the conclusions drawn. From the survey, a number of guiding 
methodological recommendations are generated, which may help ensure more robust empirical 
results. Apart from the more technical issues relating to the statistical investigation, quite 
important among the recommendations is the good sense of using aid commitments as the 
dependent variable, since this (and not disbursements) is the relevant variable of donor 
decision. Equally important, a sufficiently comprehensive model is needed to map all relevant 
elements of donor decision-making, inter alia accounting for recipient selection and amounts 
committed separately if the nature of decision-making differs among the two, as is done in the 
limited dependent variable models pioneered by Dudley and Montmarquette.  
 
PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
The third and final type of investigation into aid allocation is prescriptive analysis. This 
literature is normative in approach, saying how development aid ought to be allocated. Sharing 
the evaluative approach of the descriptive literature, the prescriptive studies go a step further 
by pointing out the discrepancy between the observed performance of donors and the 
performance that ought to have been, based on notions of recipient needs (and absorptive 
capacity). Recent attempts to arrive at such prescriptive conclusions are found in McGillivray 
and White (1993b, 1993c).49 The first of these papers developed a supply-side model of aid 
allocation based on recipient needs (income per capita, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, 
school enrolment, and GDP growth) and absorptive capacity to arrive at an index of donor 
performance measuring the deviation between prescribed and observed allocations.50 
Allocation of aid wholly according to recipient needs and absorptive capacity will yield an 
index number of 1, while -1 would reflect the theoretical (but practically implausible) case 
where no aid would be given to the sample countries. 
                                              
49 Earlier studies include McGillivray and Remenyi (1990), Cline and Sargen (1975), Adelman and 
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The performance of DAC donors, multilateral aid agencies, and all donors taken together was 
assessed for the 1974-90 period. The results showed generally very poor performances 
throughout the period and across the board. The best performance achieved by DAC 
members as a group, for instance, came in 1987 when the index number reached only 0.122, a 
far cry from 1. The best index result for the multilateral agencies, quite unexpectedly, was 
even worse, reaching only 0.104 (in 1984). Indeed, contrary to previous results, in year-to-year 
comparisons, bilateral donors performed better (or rather less worse) than multilateral agencies 
in nine of the 17 years examined. One would have expected the political and commercial 
considerations of bilateral donors to have rendered their performance inferior to that of 
multilateral agencies. This was not the case, however, leading to speculations about the 
legitimacy of the notion of multilateral aid being relatively more poverty-oriented and needs-
based than bilateral aid. Another result to emerge from the study was that the larger recipient 
countries (in terms of population size) tended to receive less than they ought to, based on 
development needs, while (strategically important) recipients like Syria, Israel and Egypt 
received more aid than development needs alone would seem to justify. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Morris (1968) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1961). 
50 Absorptive capacity is measured by ((ODA disbursement/ODA commitments) x (investment-GDP 
ratio)). 
The second prescriptive study by McGillivray and White extended the supply-side model 
beyond pure development criteria, by including the political and commercial concerns of 
donors. This extension can be seen to reflect a more pragmatic view of donor decision-making 
in which there are an awful lot of people who think they should have a hand in how the aid 
programme is spent (Ryrie 1986). Employing basically the same line of analysis as used in the 
development-based supply model, McGillivray and White generate an index of performance 
where both recipient needs (subject to the limitations imposed by absorptive capacity) and 
donor objectives are explicitly accounted for, subject to an aid budget constraint. 
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Since recipient needs, commercial and political consideration may vary in significance a set of 
weights are attached to scale their relative importance. The weight for recipient needs 
(captured by the same variables as used in the former study, with population size included) was 
set at 0.5, while the weights for commercial and political objectives were set at 0.25 each.51 
This framework was used to assess the performance of four major donors (France, United 
Kingdom, United States, and Japan) during the 1977-90 period. Overall, confirming the results 
of the former study, the performance was far from impressive, with France achieving the 
highest average index value for 1977-90 (0.22), the United States the lowest value (-0.31), with 
UK (0.01) and Japan (0.00) in the middle. A recent study by Collier and Dollar (1998), though 
using a different approach, reached similar conclusions, except that the World Bank appeared 
to perform above average.52 Of interest for further study along these lines would be to 
examine the performance of all donors individually, since there are bound to be substantial 
differences across DAC members.  
 
                                              
51 Commercial and political objectives were captured by donor exports to the recipient (value and share), 
a geostrategic dummy variable, donor arms transfers to the recipient, and total DAC aid to the recipient 
less aid from the donor, the latter intended to capture a possible band wagon effect. 
52 Collier and Dollar use a combination of infant mortality rates and good policy indicators as allocative 
criteria, on the assertion that aid provided in a good policy context leads to higher growth rates which 
in turn leads to less poverty and lower mortality rates. 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided a brief historical background of foreign aid as well as a descriptive 
analysis of aid flows over the past three decades or so, considering volume, composition, 
allocation and conditions. Historically, foreign aid has served a multitude of objectives. For 
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some of the smaller donors, the allocation and quality of aid flows have been largely, but not 
wholly, shaped by a concern for the development needs of the recipient community. By 
contrast, the foreign aid of several of the larger donors has been firmly established as a foreign 
and commercial policy tool, designed to achieve a range of political, strategic, economic, but 
also genuinely humanitarian objectives. This assertion is born by observing the historical 
origins of foreign aid and is supported by the empirical literature on aid allocation. Indeed, it 
seems that donor self-interest has been an enduring feature of donor-recipient relations over 
the past four to five decades, a relationship that has otherwise been characterized by many 
changes in terms of the volume, composition, types, and objectives of aid flows. Yet while this 
particular character of aid flows may well have impaired the effectiveness of aid, by nature, 
there is no automatic contradiction between donor and recipient objectives. 
 
Perhaps the most important of recent changes in the aid picture is the clear reversal after 1992 
of the historic upward trend in aid volumes. This may not be a big problem when declining aid 
flows are compensated by higher private flows, as has happened in several developing 
countries. Yet it may be a considerable problem in low-income countries without access to 
private capital and which continue to rely heavily on aid for financial resources. Clearly, the 
underlying premises of donor-recipient cooperation are very different when aid resources 
become more limited rather than more abundant, especially when debt service is still a factor 
of significance. The need to keep objectives and rationales clear turn out to be even more 
important. 
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Appendix A: Net ODA disbursements to developing countries, DAC donors, 1967-97. 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
            
Net ODA disbursements, current prices:             
Amounts in US$ billions 6.4 6.9 6.9 6.7 7.3 8.8 8.7 11.2 13.3 13.3 15.0 
            
Deflators (in terms of US$, index 1990=100):             
Developing country import unit value (IUV) 26.5 26.3 26.8 27.6 28.9 30.8 38.9 54.2 58.9 59.5 64.7 
OECD GDP deflator 18.6 19.1 20.0 21.2 23.0 26.0 31.1 34.5 39.2 40.7 44.5 
            
Net ODA disbursements, 1990 prices, US$ billions:             
Real net ODA disbursements, IUV based 24.0 26.3 25.7 24.3 25.2 28.7 22.4 20.6 22.5 22.3 23.1 
Real net ODA disbursements, OECD GDP based 34.2 36.2 34.5 31.7 31.7 34.0 28.0 32.4 33.8 32.6 33.6 
continues… 
 
Appendix A (continued): Net ODA disbursements to developing countries, DAC donors, 1967-97. 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
           
Net ODA disbursements, current prices:           
Amounts in US$ billions 19.2 21.8 26.2 24.6 27.0 26.8 28.1 28.8 35.8 40.6 
           
Deflators (in terms of US$, index 1990=100):           
Developing country import unit value (IUV) 70.5 83.0 100.9 103.9 99.4 98.0 95.4 91.4 88.7 91.5 
OECD GDP deflator 52.7 58.5 63.9 61.1 59.0 58.4 57.0 57.4 72.6 84.2 
           
Net ODA disbursements, 1990 prices, US$ billions:           
Real net ODA disbursements, IUV based 27.2 26.3 26.0 23.7 27.2 27.3 29.5 31.5 40.4 44.4 
Real net ODA disbursements, OECD GDP based 36.3 37.3 41.0 40.2 45.8 45.8 49.4 50.1 49.4 48.2 
continues... 
Appendix A (continued): Net ODA disbursements to developing countries, DAC donors, 1967-97. 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
           
Net ODA disbursements. current prices:           
Amounts in US$ billions 47.1 45.7 54.5 58.6 62.7 56.5 59.2 58.9 55.4 47.9 
           
Deflators (in terms of US$, index 1990=100):           
Developing country import unit value (IUV) 95.8 97.8 100.0 100.4 99.1 98.2 102.5 113.0 111.2 n.a. 
OECD GDP deflator 91.0 89.8 100.0 103.5 109.9 108.2 113.0 124.2 120.3 n.a. 
           
Net ODA disbursements, 1990 prices. US$ billions:           
Real net ODA disbursements, IUV based 49.1 46.8 54.5 58.3 63.3 57.5 57.7 52.2 49.9 n.a. 
Real net ODA disbursements, OECD GDP based 51.7 51.0 54.5 56.6 57.1 52.2 52.3 47.4 46.1 n.a. 
Sources: OECD (1998a, 1998b) and IMF (various issues), International Financial Statistics. 
 
 
Appendix B: Net ODA disbursements to developing countries, by type and donor origin, all donors, 1973-96. 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Bilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 5.7 7.6 8.8 8.6 9.0 11.6 14.4 17.5 15.9 15.6 15.9 17.9 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 3.0 3.7 5.2 4.4 4.1 7.0 7.3 8.2 8.8 6.7 5.7 4.8 
ODA total (US$ billion) 8.7 11.3 14.0 13.0 13.2 18.6 21.7 25.7 24.8 22.3 21.6 22.6 
ODA grants (% of total) 65.2 67.5 63.0 65.8 68.7 62.4 66.4 68.0 64.3 69.9 73.5 78.9 
ODA loans (% of total) a 34.8 32.5 37.0 34.2 31.3 37.6 33.6 32.0 35.7 30.1 26.5 21.1 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Multilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.5 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.9 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.9 3.5 3.1 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 
ODA total (US$ billion) 2.0 2.8 3.8 3.8 4.8 6.0 6.2 7.8 7.9 7.6 7.4 7.6 
ODA grants (% of total) 53.1 52.8 55.7 42.9 39.2 41.4 50.2 44.7 51.8 49.4 50.3 52.0 
ODA loans (% of total) a 46.9 47.2 44.3 57.1 60.8 58.6 49.8 55.3 48.2 50.6 49.7 48.0 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
           Cont. 
Total ODA 
ODA grants (US$ billion) 6.7 9.1 10.9 10.2 10.9 14.1 17.6 20.9 20.0 19.3 19.6 21.8 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 4.0 5.0 6.9 6.6 7.1 10.5 10.4 12.5 12.6 10.5 9.4 8.4 
ODA total (US$ billion) 10.7 14.1 17.8 16.8 18.0 24.6 28.0 33.5 32.7 29.9 29.0 30.2 
ODA grants (% of total) 63.0 64.5 61.5 60.6 60.8 57.3 62.8 62.6 61.3 64.7 67.5 72.2 
ODA loans (% of total) a 37.0 35.5 38.5 39.4 39.2 42.7 37.2 37.4 38.7 35.3 32.5 27.8 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Memo: Bilateral ODA in % of total 81.7 80.2 78.6 77.2 73.1 75.6 77.7 76.8 75.8 74.6 74.4 74.9 
Memo: Multilat. ODA in % of total 18.3 19.8 21.4 22.8 269 244 22.3 23.2 24.2 25.4 25.6 25.1 
continues... 
Appendix B (continued): Net ODA disbursements to developing countries, by type and donor origin, all donors, 1973-96. 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Bilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 19.6 23.4 25.1 26.6 27.3 38.1 39.1 35.7 34.4 35.8 36.6 37.0 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 4.6 5.6 6.8 7.2 7.0 6.4 6.5 8.2 5.8 6.3 4.5 2.7 
ODA total (US$ billion) 24.2 29.1 31.8 33.8 34.4 44.5 45.7 43.9 40.3 42.1 41.1 39.7 
ODA grants (% of total) 81.2 80.6 78.8 78.7 79.6 85.6 85.7 81.3 85.5 85.1 89.0 93.2 
ODA loans (% of total) a 18.8 19.4 21.2 21.3 20.4 14.4 14.3 18.7 14.5 14.9 11.0 6.8 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Multilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 4.4 4.5 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.2 9.0 10.2 10.0 10.4 10.5 10.3 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 3.6 4.2 4.8 4.8 5.7 6.3 7.2 7.4 6.7 8.8 8.7 8.5 
ODA total (US$ billion) 8.1 8.7 9.9 11.1 12.4 13.5 16.2 17.6 16.8 19.2 19.2 18.9 
ODA grants (% of total) 54.9 51.7 51.1 56.8 53.7 53.0 55.5 57.8 59.8 54.2 54.7 54.8 
ODA loans (% of total) a 45.1 48.3 48.9 43.2 46.3 47.0 44.5 42.2 40.2 45.8 45.3 45.2 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
           Cont. 
Total ODA 
ODA grants (US$ billion) 24.1 28.0 30.1 33.0 34.0 45.3 48.1 45.9 44.5 46.2 47.1 47.3 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 8.2 9.8 11.6 12.0 12.8 12.8 13.8 15.6 12.6 15.1 13.2 11.2 
ODA total (US$ billion) 32.2 37.8 41.7 45.0 46.8 58.0 61.9 61.5 57.1 61.3 60.3 58.5 
ODA grants (% of total) 74.6 74.0 72.2 73.3 72.7 78.0 77.8 74.6 78.0 75.4 78.1 80.8 
ODA loans (% of total) a 25.4 26.0 27.8 26.7 27.3 22.0 22.2 25.4 22.0 24.6 21.9 19.2 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Memo: Bilateral ODA in % of total 74.9 76.9 76.3 75.3 73.5 76.7 73.8 71.4 70.6 68.6 68.2 67.8 
Memo: Multilat. ODA in % of total 25.1 23.1 23.7 24.7 26.5 23.3 26.2 28.6 29.4 31.4 31.8 32.2 
Note: a ODA loans have been calculated by subtracting ODA grants from total ODA. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
Appendix C: Net ODA disbursements to sub-Saharan African countries, by type and donor origin, all donors, 1973-96. 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Bilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.8 3.2 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9 4.1 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 
ODA total (US$ billion) 1.3 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.6 3.3 4.4 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.3 5.3 
ODA grants (% of total) 80.1 76.7 74.2 76.7 76.4 84.7 72.5 80.6 76.5 74.8 73.7 77.9 
ODA loans (% of total) a 19.9 23.3 25.8 23.3 23.6 15.3 27.5 19.4 23.5 25.2 26.3 22.1 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Multilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 
ODA total (US$ billion) 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 
ODA grants (% of total) 75.6 69.0 66.1 56.6 50.4 49.0 48.7 51.0 58.1 48.5 54.2 57.1 
ODA loans (% of total) a 24.4 31.0 33.9 43.4 49.6 51.0 51.3 49.0 41.9 51.5 45.8 42.9 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cont. 
 
Total ODA 
ODA grants (US$ billion) 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.5 3.7 4.2 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.6 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.4 2.2 
ODA total (US$ billion) 1.8 2.5 3.3 3.2 3.7 5.0 6.4 7.5 7.5 7.8 7.5 7.8 
ODA grants (% of total) 78.8 74.4 71.6 70.4 68.5 72.7 65.2 71.1 70.6 67.0 67.9 71.3 
ODA loans (% of total) a 21.2 25.6 28.4 29.6 31.5 27.3 34.8 28.9 29.4 33.0 32.1 28.7 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Memo: Bilateral ODA in % of total 72.0 70.5 68.5 68.9 69.7 66.3 69.2 68.1 68.0 70.5 70.4 68.1 
Memo: Multilat. ODA in % of total 28.0 29.5 31.5 31.1 30.3 33.7 30.8 31.9 32.0 29.5 29.6 31.9 
continues... 
Appendix C (continued): Net ODA disbursements to sub-Saharan African countries, by type and donor origin, all donors, 1973-96. 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Bilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 5.2 6.2 6.8 7.8 7.9 11.6 10.5 9.8 9.6 10.2 10.0 9.3 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 0.3 0.6 1.7 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4 
ODA total (US$ billion) 6.2 7.5 8.6 9.8 9.8 11.9 11.1 11.6 10.7 10.9 10.4 9.7 
ODA grants (% of total) 84.1 82.2 78.9 79.9 81.2 97.3 94.4 85.0 89.7 93.9 96.2 95.8 
ODA loans (% of total) a 15.9 17.8 21.1 20.1 18.8 2.7 5.6 15.0 10.3 6.1 3.8 4.2 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Multilateral ODA             
ODA grants (US$ billion) 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.4 4.4 3.5 4.1 3.5 3.6 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 1.1 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.9 4.5 3.4 
ODA total (US$ billion) 2.8 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.5 6.0 6.6 7.6 6.6 8.0 8.1 7.0 
ODA grants (% of total) 61.3 50.4 42.5 54.6 51.2 48.6 52.1 58.8 52.9 51.1 43.9 51.9 
ODA loans (% of total) a 38.7 49.6 57.5 45.4 48.8 51.4 47.9 41.2 47.1 48.9 56.1 48.1 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
           Cont. 
Total ODA 
ODA grants (US$ billion) 7.0 7.9 8.5 10.4 10.8 14.5 13.9 14.3 13.1 14.3 13.5 12.9 
ODA loans (US$ billion) a 2.1 3.0 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.4 3.8 4.9 4.2 4.6 4.9 3.8 
ODA total (US$ billion) 9.0 10.9 12.7 14.4 15.3 17.9 17.7 19.1 17.3 18.9 8.4 16.7 
ODA grants (% of total) 76.9 72.2 67.1 71.7 70.4 80.9 78.6 74.6 75.6 75.7 73.3 77.4 
ODA loans (% of total) a 23.1 27.8 32.9 28.3 29.6 19.1 21.4 25.4 24.4 24.3 26.7 22.6 
ODA total (% of total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Memo: Bilateral ODA in % of total 68.5 68.5 67.6 67.6 63.8 66.5 62.6 60.5 61.7 57.6 56.2 58.2 
Memo: Multilat. ODA in % of total 31.5 31.5 32.4 32.4 36.2 33.5 37.4 39.5 38.3 42.4 43.8 41.8 
Note: a ODA loans have been calculated by subtracting ODA grants from total ODA. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
Appendix D: Net ODA disbursements, details on aid types, all donors, 1987-96 (per cent). 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Bilateral ODA 71.8 69.2 73.1 72.0 75.5 70.2 71.4 71.5 70.6 72.8 
BILATERAL ODA GRANTS 56.1 54.6 58.3 60.6 61.5 56.9 59.9 60.6 62.5 67.6 
1. Project and programme aid 23.2 21.4 23.6 20.2 18.5 18.1 17.9 18.0 17.7 21.4 
1.a. Capital project aid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.2 9.6 
1.b. Programme aid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.4 4.1 
o.w. Sector programme aid n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.5 
2. Technical co-operation 20.4 19.8 19.8 19.9 18.9 20.0 21.3 20.0 22.3 23.3 
3. Grants in associated finan. Packages 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
4. Development food aid 4.2 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.5 1.9 
5. Emergency and distress relief 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.1 5.1 4.2 6.0 6.5 5.5 5.7 
6. Action on debt relief 0.5 0.6 1.2 7.5 9.2 4.4 4.4 5.4 5.7 5.7 
7. Support to national & internat. NGOs 1.9 1.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.6 
8. Promotion of development awareness 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
9. Administrative costs 3.5 3.4 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.9 
10. Other grants 0.5 5.6 1.4 2.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 
 
 
 
 
         Cont. 
BILATERAL ODA NON-GRANTS 15.7 14.6 14.9 11.3 10.3 12.3 9.9 9.7 7.2 4.5 
o.w. Food aid loans 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 
o.w. Debt rescheduling 1.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 8.2 1.5 2.6 2.3 0.5 0.2 
o.w. Other lending 14.3 13.8 15.7 13.8 16.8 16.1 20.1 14.9 1.7 0.5 
Multilateral ODA 27.9 30.8 26.9 27.9 24.2 29.2 28.4 28.2 29.2 27.1 
Total ODA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: OECD (1998b). 
Appendix E: ODA net disbursements in percent of donor GNP, DAC donors, 1987-97. 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Australia 0.34 0.46 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.28 0.28 
Austria 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.24 0.26 
Belgium 0.48 0.39 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.31 
Canada 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.36 
Denmark 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.96 1.02 1.03 1.03 0.96 1.04 0.97 
Finland 0.50 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.80 0.64 0.45 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.33 
France 0.60 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.55 0.48 0.45 
Germany 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.28 
Ireland 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.31 
Italy 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.15 0.20 0.11 
Japan 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.20 0.22 
Luxembourg 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.50 
Netherlands 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.82 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.81 
New Zealand 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.25 
Norway 1.09 1.13 1.05 1.17 1.13 1.12 1.01 1.05 0.87 0.85 0.86 
Portugal 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.21 0.25 
Spain 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.23 
Sweden 0.88 0.86 0.96 0.91 0.90 1.03 0.99 0.96 0.77 0.84 0.76 
Switzerland 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.45 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.32 
United Kingdom 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.26 
United States 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.08 
DAC total 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.22 
Note: The UN-target is 0.70 per cent. 
Source: OECD (1998b). 
Appendix F: ODA commitments by sector and purpose, DAC donors, 1973-97 (per cent). 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Social infrastructure and services 20.8 18.4 22.7 17.9 18.3 21.4 22.3 24.7 24.5 24.1 25.8 27.4 
Economic infrastructure and services 10.0 13.0 10.3 10.7 14.3 16.9 18.0 18.0 16.3 19.5 17.8 19.8 
Production sectors 18.7 20.8 21.9 21.4 20.2 21.5 26.6 24.8 26.5 26.6 25.4 15.8 
Multisector (crosscutting) 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.4 1.6 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.8 2.2 1.9 9.2 
Commodity aid & gen. programme aid 19.9 6.2 19.1 18.7 12.4 12.7 14.1 10.5 10.0 13.1 11.7 12.4 
Action relating to debt 1.5 2.4 4.1 5.9 2.0 5.0 3.1 5.7 2.9 1.3 1.3 1.7 
Emergency assistance 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Administrative costs of donors n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 
Support to NGOs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.0 
Unallocated/unspecified 25.5 36.5 18.4 22.1 30.7 18.7 12.7 12.4 15.6 11.7 14.6 4.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
continues... 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F (continued): ODA commitments by sector and purpose, DAC donors, 1973-97 (per cent). 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Social infrastructure and services 25.5 25.1 25.4 23.6 26.1 22.5 19.7 24.7 25.5 27.5 30.5 23.0 25.6 
Economic infrastructure and services 17.1 17.2 22.1 22.9 20.0 14.4 21.3 16.1 19.3 21.5 23.7 23.1 26.7 
Production sectors 19.1 18.7 17.9 18.3 17.3 11.9 10.9 16.1 11.7 10.5 10.7 13.1 11.3 
Multisector (crosscutting) 1.2 1.3 3.1 2.6 2.9 3.2 2.7 4.1 4.1 3.9 5.0 5.8 7.2 
Commodity aid & gen. prog. aid 24.5 20.4 19.2 19.3 17.5 14.3 16.4 17.8 12.6 8.4 5.8 4.7 4.7 
Action relating to debt 2.5 2.8 1.9 2.2 3.6 23.3 12.8 7.4 10.1 11.5 7.3 5.7 6.7 
Emergency assistance 2.2 2.1 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.0 4.7 5.7 6.5 4.7 5.2 5.1 5.6 
Administrative costs of donors 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.6 4.4 3.3 2.8 33.4 3.5 4.5 4.8 5.0 6.0 
Support to NGOs 2.5 3.2 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 2.0 
Unallocated/unspecified 1.7 5.3 3.7 4.6 4.6 4.2 7.6 3.0 5.6 6.5 6.2 6.8 4.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: OECD (1998b). 
 
 
 
Appendix G1: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by geographical region, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent).  
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
North Africa 10.4 11.8 15.9 15.4 18.4 13.2 8.1 8.1 8.4 8.7 7.6 8.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.7 17.5 18.7 19.2 20.6 20.5 22.8 22.5 22.9 26.1 25.8 25.8 
South America 5.8 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.4 
Middle East 8.4 11.2 12.2 14.6 16.4 12.7 18.9 15.9 15.4 13.4 13.8 11.6 
South & Central Asia 16.2 17.4 20.3 19.9 15.6 14.4 15.1 16.7 14.7 16.3 15.9 15.0 
Far East Asia 18.1 16.4 10.3 9.2 8.3 7.9 7.9 7.8 9.7 8.9 9.2 9.4 
Other a 24.3 21.0 18.3 18.0 17.5 28.5 24.4 26.7 25.6 23.4 24.6 26.7 
o.w. Europe 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.9 3.6 2.9 2.7 1.8 1.4 
Total by region 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: a Includes Europe, Oceania, Central America and geographically unallocated.  
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Appendix G1 (continued): Net ODA disbursements, allocation by geographical region, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
North Africa 8.9 6.5 6.4 5.5 5.3 12.4 11.3 8.7 6.6 6.4 4.9 5.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 28.0 28.9 30.4 3.1 32.8 30.9 28.6 31.1 30.4 30.8 30.6 28.6 
South America 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.6 4.2 3.6 4.8 4.1 4.9 5.5 
Middle East 12.2 10.6 8.3 5.6 5.4 8.2 8.6 6.1 5.5 7.2 4.8 8.3 
South and Central Asia 14.6 15.3 13.5 14.6 14.1 10.6 13.4 11.1 10.1 13.3 10.7 11.4 
Far East Asia 9.0 9.7 10.8 12.0 13.2 12.1 10.7 14.6 14.9 13.6 14.8 11.8 
Other a 23.9 25.7 27.1 26.7 25.3 22.2 23.3 24.8 27.7 24.6 29.2 28.7 
o.w. Europe 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 0.8 2.5 3.6 3.7 6.0 3.6 3.8 4.3 
Total by region 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: a Includes Europe, Oceania, Central America and geographically unallocated. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
Appendix G2: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by geographical region, UN-target donors, 1973-96 (per cent).  
  1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
North Africa 3.5 3.0 3.9 2.9 3.0 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 33.8 29.5 31.9 32.7 36.6 35.4 35.2 36.5 36.1 37.8 40.2 41.4 
South America 8.8 9.8 7.8 11.6 8.5 5.9 6.6 6.2 6.9 7.1 3.5 3.6 
Middle East 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.0 
South & Central Asia 17.0 25.9 28.4 20.2 21.3 26.5 22.3 21.8 22.5 20.3 20.3 19.5 
Far East Asia 21.2 15.1 16.5 16.1 15.5 12.7 10.4 10.3 10.0 11.2 8.7 10.0 
Other a  9.9 12.6 6.7 12.4 9.8 13.2 18.6 19.3 18.4 18.5 22.6 20.5 
o.w. Europe 2.0 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.4 
Total by region 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: UN-target donors are Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. a Includes Europe, Oceania, Central America and geographically unallocated. 
continues... 
 
Appendix G2 (continued): Net ODA disbursements, allocation by geographical region, UN-target donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
North Africa 1.2 2.6 2.5 1.1 1.4 2.7 0.7 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 42.3 46.4 43.4 45.5 38.5 41.0 37.9 38.8 37.1 35.6 34.9 35.2 
South America 3.9 2.7 3.0 3.2 4.7 4.2 4.2 5.0 5.7 5.2 5.5 5.8 
Middle East 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.6 4.4 4.9 
South and Central Asia 19.6 18.2 16.0 14.8 17.4 13.4 12.6 11.1 10.1 11.2 11.6 10.6 
Far East Asia 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.5 9.7 8.8 7.2 6.0 4.7 4.3 4.5 5.3 
Other a 22.0 17.7 22.2 21.7 25.4 25.1 33.3 30.5 30.3 31.8 31.2 31.1 
o.w. Europe 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 3.4 7.4 6.5 5.3 4.5 
Total by region 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: UN-target donors are Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. a Includes Europe, Oceania, Central America and geographically unallocated. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
 
 
Appendix G3: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by income groups, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
LLDCs a 18.3 21.5 22.7 21.3 24.3 23.4 25.6 25.3 24.2 28.2 27.1 26.4 
Other Low Income b 19.6 21.9 20.2 21.2 16.0 14.8 15.7 18.1 18.0 18.8 19.4 19.6 
Low Middle Income c 32.9 32.3 34.3 34.7 37.4 30.6 32.1 30.9 31.1 29.3 27.9 26.2 
Upper Middle Income d 4.4 4.6 4.2 4.3 3.6 2.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.8 
Higher Income e 6.3 4.2 5.6 7.0 8.1 6.1 6.6 5.0 5.2 5.0 6.8 6.1 
Unallocated 18.4 15.5 13.2 11.5 10.7 22.8 17.1 18.1 17.9 15.1 15.2 18.0 
Total by income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: a Least Developed Countries. b Countries with per capita GNP<US$765 in 1995. c Countries with per capita GNP between US$766 and US$3035 in 1995. d 
Countries with per capita GNP between US$3036 and US$9385 in 1995. e Countries with per capita GNP>US$9385 in 1995. 
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Appendix G3 (continued): Net ODA disbursements, allocation by income groups, all donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
LLDCs a 28.5 28.7 30.2 29.9 29.1 27.6 25.9 27.0 26.5 26.5 27.6 24.3 
Other Low Income b 18.0 19.4 18.0 21.8 22.8 19.0 21.5 23.1 21.8 26.8 25.5 25.4 
Low Middle Income c 25.8 23.2 24.0 21.3 21.5 30.8 29.7 26.9 27.4 23.4 21.9 23.1 
Upper Middle Income d 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.4 2.6 3.2 2.9 2.1 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.5 
Higher Income e 8.1 7.4 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.0 4.3 4.7 3.9 3.3 2.4 5.2 
Unallocated 16.5 18.0 19.3 19.8 19.5 15.4 15.8 16.3 16.6 16.1 18.7 18.5 
Total by income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: a Least Developed Countries. b Countries with per capita GNP<US$765 in 1995. c Countries with per capita GNP between US$766 and US$3035 in 1995. d 
Countries with per capita GNP between US$3036 and US$9385 in 1995. e Countries with per capita GNP>US$9385 in 1995. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
Appendix G4: Net ODA disbursements, allocation by income groups, UN-target donors, 1973-96 (per cent). 
  1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
LLDCs a 23.5 27.1 30.9 27.9 34.5 38.1 36.8 36.5 36.1 36.9 38.4 36.8 
Other Low Income b 28.8 29.3 35.1 33.5 32.2 30.6 26.0 28.1 27.9 27.2 27.2 29.2 
Low Middle Income c 29.6 25.3 20.9 22.7 19.5 15.9 18.0 16.3 15.9 17.1 12.1 12.2 
Uper Middle Income d 2.3 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Higher Income e 4.4 3.9 2.4 4.1 2.9 2.8 2.5 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.4 3.0 
Unallocated 11.5 13.0 10.1 10.9 10.3 12.1 16.0 14.7 15.6 15.2 18.1 17.9 
Total by income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: UN-target donors are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands. a Least Developed Countries. b Countries with per capita GNP<US$765 in 1995. c 
Countries with per capita GNP between US$766 and US$3035 in 1995. d Countries with per capita GNP between US$3036 and US$9385 in 1995. e Countries with per 
capita GNP>US$9385 in 1995.  
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Appendix G4 (continued): Net ODA disbursements, allocation by income groups, UN-target donors, 1973-96 per cent). 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
LLDCs a 38.6 40.6 36.3 40.8 35.4 37.5 36.6 34.1 34.1 33.0 32.8 32.7 
Other Low Income b 25.9 26.6 23.4 24.6 25.9 20.7 17.3 18.4 16.2 19.5 20.2 19.9 
Low Middle Income c 10.4 11.5 14.0 12.5 14.1 14.8 12.2 14.0 17.9 13.0 14.8 14.9 
Upper Middle Income d 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.5 3.2 3.8 3.5 3.5 
Higher Income e 4.0 3.6 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.4 1.5 2.3 2.6 
Unallocated 20.0 16.6 22.7 18.9 21.4 23.4 29.5 29.4 26.3 29.2 26.4 26.5 
Total by income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: UN-target donors are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands. a Least Developed Countries. b Countries with per capita GNP<US$765 in 1995. c 
Countries with per capita GNP between US$766 and US$3035 in 1995. d Countries with per capita GNP between US$3036 and US$9385 in 1995. e Countries with per 
capita GNP>US$9385 in 1995. 
Source: OECD (1998a). 
Appendix H: Bilateral ODA commitments, financial terms data, DAC donors, 
1973-96 (per cent). 
 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Japan 
Grant share of ODA a 15.8 7.1 0.0 7.2 7.0 12.6 18.7 15.0 
Loan share of ODA 84.2 92.9 100.0 92.8 93.0 87.4 81.3 85.0 
GE of ODA loans 48.1 46.4 51.3 50.8 51.1 50.9 54.2 55.7 
GE of ODA 56.3 50.2 51.3 54.3 54.5 57.1 62.8 62.4 
United States         
Grant share of ODA a 34.2 35.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.7 59.9 
Loan share of ODA 65.8 64.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 80.3 40.1 
GE of ODA loans 67.4 64.8 64.9 64.7 65.3 65.9 65.8 65.1 
GE of ODA 78.5 77.4 64.9 64.7 65.3 65.9 72.5 86.0 
France         
Grant share of ODA a 72.5 34.3 68.3 27.9 48.4 15.8 21.9 18.7 
Loan share of ODA 27.5 65.7 31.7 72.1 51.6 84.2 78.1 81.3 
GE of ODA loans 47.6 42.7 47.1 46.1 45.6 43.8 42.6 46.9 
GE of ODA 85.6 62.4 83.2 61.1 71.9 52.7 55.2 56.8 
Germany         
Grant share of ODA a 16.0 6.5 11.1 10.3 7.9 11.5 27.2 48.5 
Loan share of ODA 84.0 93.5 88.9 89.7 92.1 88.5 72.8 51.5 
GE of ODA loans 65.6 66.1 65.7 65.8 64.1 67.3 61.1 60.5 
GE of ODA 71.2 68.3 69.5 69.4 67.0 71.1 71.6 79.7 
DAC donors total          
Grant share of ODA a 35.1 30.2 24.3 23.8 31.8 39.2 38.7 48.1 
Loan share of ODA 64.9 69.8 75.7 76.2 68.2 60.8 61.3 51.9 
GE of ODA loans 63.3 59.1 63.2 62.3 60.5 61.4 59.9 58.4 
GE of ODA 76.1 71.4 72.1 71.2 73.0 76.5 75.4 78.4 
 
 
 
 
       Cont. 
UN-target donors b 
Grant share of ODA a 63.2 68.7 76.1 69.3 77.8 74.7 79.8 71.4 
Loan share of ODA 36.8 31.3 23.9 30.7 22.2 25.3 20.2 28.6 
GE of ODA loans 69.3 67.4 72.1 61.9 65.5 68.1 69.5 63.3 
GE of ODA 88.7 89.8 93.3 88.3 92.3 91.9 93.8 89.5 
Notes: GE = grant element. a Grants refer to both ODA grants as well as equity investment and grant-like 
loans since these have a grant element of 100 percent also. b Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. 
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Appendix H (continued): Bilateral ODA commitments, financial terms data, DAC donors, 1973-96 (per 
cent). 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Japan 
Grant share of ODA a 17.8 19.1 20.3 19.8 20.0 27.1 18.7 18.7 
Loan share of ODA 82.2 80.9 79.7 80.2 80.0 72.9 81.3 81.3 
GE of ODA loans 54.6 55.5 53.3 50.9 48.7 50.6 52.4 56.9 
GE of ODA 62.6 64.0 62.7 60.6 58.9 64.0 61.3 65.0 
United States 
Grant share of ODA a 70.7 70.9 73.8 70.3 85.1 86.4 88.2 81.6 
Loan share of ODA 29.3 29.1 26.2 29.7 14.9 13.6 11.8 18.4 
GE of ODA loans 62.0 64.1 61.4 64.0 63.4 63.5 6.7 64.5 
GE of ODA 88.9 89.6 89.9 89.3 94.5 95.1 95.7 93.5 
France 
Grant share of ODA a 18.1 14.4 15.9 11.9 12.1 11.9 16.4 16.8 
Loan share of ODA 81.9 85.6 84.1 88.1 87.9 88.1 83.6 83.2 
GE of ODA loans 47.5 45.4 47.4 47.4 50.3 48.3 44.9 55.0 
GE of ODA 57.0 53.3 55.7 53.7 56.4 54.4 53.9 62.6 
Germany 
Grant share of ODA a 24.0 25.7 30.6 24.0 42.9 28.7 26.0 23.7 
Loan share of ODA 76.0 74.3 69.4 76.0 57.1 71.3 74.0 76.3 
GE of ODA loans 57.8 63.0 60.0 52.8 50.6 49.6 50.6 53.9 
GE of ODA 67.9 72.5 72.2 64.1 71.8 64.0 63.4 64.9 
DAC donors total 
Grant share of ODA a 46.3 50.5 54.6 52.7 63.1 64.6 55.9 49.1 
Loan share of ODA 53.7 49.5 45.4 47.3 36.9 35.4 44.1 50.9 
GE of ODA loans 57.1 57.4 55.1 55.7 53.3 53.6 51.9 56.6 
GE of ODA 76.9 78.9 79.6 79.1 82.8 83.6 78.8 77.9 
 
 
 
 
       Cont. 
UN-target donors b 
Grant share of ODA a 81.3 82.8 80.7 83.3 85.8 87.5 88.9 87.9 
Loan share of ODA 18.7 17.2 19.3 16.7 14.2 12.5 11.1 12.1 
GE of ODA loans 67.9 69.5 64.2 64.4 68.7 70.6 56.6 53.5 
GE of ODA 94.0 94.7 93.1 94.0 95.6 96.3 95.2 94.4 
Notes: GE = grant element. a Grants refer to both ODA grants as well as equity investment and grant-like 
loans since these have a grant element of 100 percent also. b Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. 
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Appendix H (continued): Bilateral ODA commitments, financial terms data, DAC donors, 1973-96 (per 
cent). 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Japan 
Grant share of ODA a 23.0 16.0 13.7 7.4 16.5 24.7 18.3 16.7 
Loan share of ODA 77.0 84.0 86.3 92.6 83.5 75.3 81.7 83.3 
GE of ODA loans 58.5 57.2 58.8 58.4 58.3 63.0 65.5 65.9 
GE of ODA 68.1 64.0 64.5 61.5 65.2 72.2 71.8 71.6 
United States 
Grant share of ODA a 93.4 90.3 56.6 94.7 95.0 96.8 96.2 0.0 
Loan share of ODA 6.6 9.7 43.4 5.3 5.0 3.2 3.8 100.0 
GE of ODA loans 62.6 63.5 55.4 58.7 59.2 59.2 53.6 53.1 
GE of ODA 97.5 96.4 80.7 97.8 98.0 98.7 98.3 53.1 
France 
Grant share of ODA a 16.4 21.8 32.9 32.6 26.1 55.6 43.5 46.7 
Loan share of ODA 83.6 78.2 67.1 67.4 73.9 44.4 56.5 53.3 
GE of ODA loans 56.9 50.5 40.8 48.5 50.6 53.7 54.0 50.6 
GE of ODA 64.0 61.3 60.3 65.3 63.5 79.5 74.0 73.7 
Germany 
Grant share of ODA a 18.0 44.4 37.0 7.8 25.8 34.2 65.6 28.6 
Loan share of ODA 82.0 55.6 63.0 92.2 74.2 65.8 34.4 71.4 
GE of ODA loans 57.5 50.2 51.9 54.5 57.9 56.5 57.3 60.7 
GE of ODA 65.1 72.3 69.7 58.1 68.7 71.4 85.3 72.0 
DAC donors total 
Grant share of ODA a 56.2 56.8 44.9 31.8 49.7 57.8 57.9 49.9 
Loan share of ODA 43.8 43.2 55.1 68.2 50.3 42.2 42.1 50.1 
GE of ODA loans 57.5 55.3 56.5 56.9 57.4 60.0 63.2 63.3 
GE of ODA 81.4 80.7 76.0 70.6 78.6 83.1 84.5 81.6 
 
 
 
 
       Cont. 
UN-target donors b 
Grant share of ODA a 92.4 94.1 97.7 97.5 99.8 99.5 99.5 99.8 
Loan share of ODA 7.6 5.9 2.3 2.5 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 
GE of ODA loans 50.9 59.4 61.7 48.5 27.1 44.2 51.7 29.1 
GE of ODA 96.3 97.6 99.1 98.7 99.9 99.7 99.8 99.8 
Notes: GE = grant element. a Grants refer to both ODA grants as well as equity investment and grant-like 
loans since these have a grant element of 100 percent also. b Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. 
Source: Authors calculations based on data from OECD (1998c). 
Appendix I: Bilateral ODA commitments, share of untied aid, DAC donors, 1979-97 (per cent). 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Austria 1.4 0.7 3.4 3.1 4.3 4.4 3.0 3.3 2.7 1.9 
Australia 64.8 66.4 60.0 58.3 62.8 57.9 53.4 49.8 48.3 56.3 
Belgium 27.0 25.7 29.0 22.9 26.3 49.4 37.5 44.0 37.9 n.a. 
Canada 17.5 10.0 18.0 17.3 3.5 44.4 42.3 45.2 n.a. 38.0 
Denmark 66.4 57.6 63.6 65.5 61.4 59.3 60.4 63.3 60.2 72.2 
Finland 94.5 37.2 84.9 82.6 n.a. 70.0 80.9 50.0 24.0 26.5 
France 38.9 43.3 42.5 37.4 38.6 39.0 42.5 42.4 50.8 50.7 
Germany 77.4 82.2 74.3 70.4 55.6 67.8 63.7 64.5 56.1 54.8 
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.1 100.0 42.8 90.0 
Italy 80.4 26.4 71.6 54.2 55.3 13.8 16.6 9.3 13.4 123 
Japan 27.6 25.8 36.8 55.1 55.6 66.1 60.8 64.0 60.8 72.8 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 67.9 55.9 57.3 55.0 60.0 52.1 60.3 57.3 43.2 40.8 
New Zealand 100.0 48.3 36.4 38.9 53.6 53.9 78.0 57.1 51.6 47.6 
Norway 72.8 68.8 73.6 63.5 70.3 80.9 70.3 77.3 56.9 57.6 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sweden 78.8 83.5 84.0 82.7 83.4 76.7 68.8 68.7 65.1 64.8 
Switzerland 39.1 60.7 50.1 65.4 66.8 68.2 67.3 70.3 57.5 79.5 
United Kingdom 15.6 25.2 20.5 21.9 25.6 26.6 27.6 22.1 22.8 17.4 
United States 31.8 26.8 33.4 34.7 38.3 37.0 40.9 45.0 33.2 26.1 
DAC donors total 44.0 44.1 44.1 45.2 45.5 47.0 47.3 49.5 42.9 48.8 
continues... 
Appendix I (continued): Bilateral ODA commitments, share of untied aid, DAC donors, 1979-97 (per cent). 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Austria 3.1 38.8 44.9 79.5 44.8 n.a. 25.0 n.a. 60.6 
Australia 10.4 15.7 12.6 36.9 41.9 44.4 n.a. 78.1 63.1 
Belgium n.a. n.a. 10.5 15.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 49.9 
Canada 41.4 38.8 41.7 38.8 61.9 44.1 31.5 31.5 33.4 
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 61.3 61.3 71.6 
Finland 20.8 27.4 27.8 50.6 59.0 47.0 75.8 60.1 76.8 
France 47.8 47.1 44.7 31.5 31.5 50.9 58.4 38.7 n.a. 
Germany 33.8 43.6 45.8 44.8 47.9 44.3 60.3 60.0 n.a. 
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 9.1 16.6 7.0 27.7 43.1 66.4 59.8 n.a. 45.6 
Japan 70.2 77.0 79.7 73.5 83.9 81.5 96.3 98.9 99.6 
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 68.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 94.3 95.2 
Netherlands 45.8 51.2 56.3 27.6 n.a. 94.8 78.9 82.2 90.0 
New Zealand n.a. 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Norway 71.3 61.3 n.a. 81.7 81.8 85.0 77.0 88.4 91.1 
Portugal n.a. n.a. 93.7 3.3 63.8 93.2 98.2 100.0 99.1 
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sweden 71.1 78.5 83.7 85.4 85.0 81.7 93.9 64.0 74.5 
Switzerland 74.9 63.0 n.a. 64.4 91.4 95.8 91.3 92.9 94.9 
United Kingdom 24.0 n.a. n.a. 33.3 35.2 45.8 86.2 86.1 71.7 
United States 34.9 69.5 69.3 37.4 37.4 n.a. 27.3 28.4 n.a. 
DAC donors total 43.8 59.4 58.8 48.2 57.9 66.1 69.6 70.8 87.6 
Source: OECD (1998b). 
Appendix J: Aid diamonds, DAC donors, 1987 and 1996. 
 
Explanatory Note 
 
Interpretation. For each year 1987 and 1996, the charts display the aid effort of each individual DAC 
donor, as set against the average DAC effort, as well as against the targets agreed upon by DAC 
members. There are four axis to the diamond, which represent: (i) aid volume, measured as a per 
cent of donor GNP, (ii) the grant element, (iii) the share of net aid disbursement going to the least 
developed countries (LLDCs), and (iv) the percentage of bilateral aid commitments which is 
untied. Aid quality is higher the higher each of these figures, so that the better a donor’s aid 
programme then the larger the diamond. In case of untied aid, in the absence of quantitative DAC 
targets, the ‘target’ used should be understood as the maximum level of untying to which do-
nors/recipients can aspire. The DAC target for aid to LLDCs is 0.15 per cent of GNP. We have 
converted this figure to the share of a donor’s aid which would have to go to LLDCs in order to 
meet this target by dividing through by the donor’s ODA/GNP ratio. If a donor’s ratio is less than 
0.15 per cent of GNP (e.g. the US in 1996 and Spain and Portugal in 1987), then they would have 
to give over 100 per cent of their aid to LLDCs to meet the DAC target. In such cases the diamond 
for the DAC target is ‘truncated’ at the 100 per cent point. In cases where data is not available, 
this is indicated by ‘n.a.’ in parentheses.  
 
Target definitions. (i) The DAC target for the ODA/GNP ratio is set at (the UN-target of) 0.70 per 
cent (times 100 to facilitate the graphical illustration). (ii) The DAC target for the grant element is 
set at 84 per cent (see section 1.3 on financial terms). (iii) The DAC target for low-income country 
allocation (the LLDC target) is set at 0.15 per cent of GNP divided by the ODA/GNP ratio - i.e. the 
target is year and donor volume specific (see above). (iv) The DAC ‘target’ for untied aid (the 
maximum achievable share) is set at 100 per cent. 
 
Sources. (i) ODA/GNP ratio: Annex E). (ii) Grant element: Authors calculations based on data 
from OECD, (Creditor Reporting System) CRS On-line Database (www.oecd.org/DAC), Paris 
(1998). Please note the grant element data for Sweden in 1996 is not available, but is set at 100 
percent based on the performance of previous years (100 percent in all years during 1987-95). (iii) 
LLDC share: Authors calculations based on data from OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Aid Recipients (CD-Rom), Paris (1998). (iv) Untied aid share: Annex I. 





















